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Abstract 
We provide novel evidence that a firm’s engagement in employee-related issues explains part of the 
value difference between its domestic and cross-border takeovers. An acquirer’s investment in 
employee relations is positively related to the firm’s performance when acquiring domestically, but 
labor-related frictions reverse this effect when acquiring a foreign target. The results cannot be 
explained by country-level labor regulation but are consistent with the notion that labor-related 
frictions exist that prohibit firms from efficiently transforming monetary incentives in higher 
shareholder value when acquiring a foreign target firm.  
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Cross-Border Acquisitions and Employee-Engagement  
 
I. Introduction 
Cross-border M&A volume has boomed over the past 20 years – from 23% of the total deal 
value in 1998 to more than 50% of total value in 2016 - with some individual transaction values being 
close to that of a small country’s GDP.1 Cross-border acquisitions enable firms to expand their 
boundaries across national borders and provide new sources of value creation resulting from cross-
country differences in product markets (DeGiovanni, 2005), regulations and governance standards 
(Bris and Cabolis, 2008; Chari et al., 2010), taxation regimes (Huizinga and Voget, 2009), currencies 
(Erel, Liao, and Weisbach, 2012), industry specialization (Frésard, Hege, and Phillips, 2017), and 
degree of development of the financial system (Alquist et al., 2014). However, cross-country takeover 
also induce frictions that reduce merger gains. Indeed, recent studies have attempted to explain the 
marked differences in domestic and cross-border takeovers with regard to the value implications of 
factors such as language and cultural distance (Ahern et al., 2015), economic nationalism (Dinc and 
Erel, 2013), geography and bilateral trade (Erel et al., 2012), investor protection and corporate 
governance (Rossi and Volpin, 2004; Bris and Cabolis, 2008), as well as government ownership 
(Karolyi and Liao, 2017). 
In this paper, we provide novel evidence that a firm’s employee-engagement—voluntary 
policies and practices that aim to enhance a firm’s human capital and employee relations by providing 
higher compensation and job security—is strongly related to the marked differences in value 
generation between domestic and cross-border takeovers. Employees are crucial to the firm’s 
performance: they are involved in the firm’s daily operations and have a contractual claim on the 
company in the form of salaries and bonuses. Their relations with the firm are believed to be one of 
                                                           
1 For example, the 2016 deal between German drug company Bayer and US-based Monsanto was valued at 
$66 billion, which Bayer clinched with improved $66 billion bid, exceeding the 2015 GDP of Luxembourg 





the most important driving forces of M&A activities and returns to shareholders, as restructuring the 
firm’s workforce involves integrating and reconfiguring employees’ human capital to reduce costs and 
to profit from larger economies of scale and scope (Maksimovic, Phillips, and Prabhala (2011)). 
Despite a large literature on human capital in M&As, the majority of studies focus on country- or 
state-level employment protection regulations to measure the effect of human capital on merger 
synergies, finding evidence that stronger employment protection is detrimental to takeover activity 
and merger synergies (John, Knyazeva, and Knyazeva (2015), Tian and Wang (2016), Dessaint, 
Golubov, and Volpin (2017)), although the opposite is found by Alimov (2015). Still, labor market 
regulation and employment protection set only the lower bound of how employees are to be treated 
when M&As take place. Arguably, a more significant part of the labor effect, if any, may result from 
the firm’s own policies and investment in engaging and incentivizing employees (over and beyond the 
regulatory requirements). Some recent studies are along this line (Pagano and Volpin (2005), Cronqvist 
et al (2009), Masulis et al (2016)), but they mostly focus on the agency aspect of employee engagement, 
i.e., the detrimental effect of manager-employee alliances on shareholder value in M&As, and are 
limited to samples of US firms in which the roles of labor are remarkably different from the rest of 
the world (Atanassov and Kim (2009)). To date, there is little evidence on the effect of firms’ voluntary 
engagement in employee-related issues on deal performance on a global scale.  
The lack of research is partially due to the lack of data with detailed information on firm-level 
investment in employee relations, especially in a multi-country context. We utilize a newly assembled 
dataset on firm-level corporate engagement and investment in employee relations for a global sample, 
with the aim of investigating how cross-firm heterogeneity in employee-engagement (investing in 
employee satisfaction and wellbeing) that is distinct from country-level labor regulations may translate 
into short- and long-run firm performance when engaging in domestic and foreign acquisitions. 
Underlying our empirical investigation is the argument that, while generous voluntary employment 
policies by a firm can incentivize employees and hence increase labor productivity and generate 
synergy gains (Edmans (2011, 2012); Edmans, Li, and Zhang (2015)) that may be reflected in acquirer 




key feature of cross-border deals compared to domestic deals—can significantly attenuate the 
expected synergy gains from implementing specific employment policies. 
What frictions may arise in cross-border deals that affect the returns to shareholders and firm 
value when investing in employee relations? A notable example, albeit not in the context of M&As, is 
the recent frustration of the greenfield investment in the US by the Chinese company Fuyao Glass 
Industry Group. Motivated by lower manufacturing costs, Fuyao entered into the US and invested in 
General Motors’ abandoned plants in Ohio State. But the Chinese company soon faced a strong 
culture clash with its workforce as many workers questioned the company’s commitment to operating 
under American supervision and American norms. The Chinese company also faced an acrimonious 
union campaign by the United Automobile Workers, endless complaints by US employees regarding 
unfair treatment in paid time-off, and a lawsuit by a former US manager,2 in spite of a favorable stock 
market reaction when Fuyao announced its US investment plan in 2014. This example illustrates that 
managing the integration of employee policies in different national, cultural, and organizational 
contexts is likely to create a host of uncertainties (Aguilera and Dencker, 2004). In most jurisdictions, 
a buyer of a firm cannot change the human capital employed at a target company nor can it change 
the contracts that a target firm has adopted, which limits the acquirer’s possibilities for implementing 
and integrating its own employee policies in the target firm. 3 Even when such integration is possible, 
breaking implicit contracts between target’s employees and their management may not be desirable. 
Implicit contracts depend on culture and norms, the social climate (driven by important social partners 
such as unions and employers), the importance of corporate social responsibility, etc., such that 
differences in local cultural values may result in the target’s employees being less receptive to the labor 
                                                           
2 “Culture Clash at a Chinese-Owned Plant in Ohio.” New York Times, June 10, 2017. 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/10/business/economy/ohio-factory-jobs-china.html.  
3 For example, a sale of a firm triggers the “transfer of undertakings protection of employment” (TUPE) 
regulations of 1981, which stems from the European Acquired Rights directive. This regulation states that “all 
the [seller’s] rights, powers, duties and liabilities under or in connection with [an employee’s contract of 
employment], shall be transferred to the [buyer].” Furthermore, the buyer assumes the liability for “anything 
done before the transfer is completed by or in relation to the [seller] in respect of that contract or a person 
employed in that undertaking or part” (Calcagno and Renneboog, 2007). TUPE states that such an act “shall 




policies implemented by the acquiring firm. Consequently, transferring the acquirer’s employment 
policy to and integrating it in a foreign target may not be straightforward nor, even if it were possible, 
would it be expected to have the same impact on productivity and firm performance as in the acquirer. 
We therefore argue that, although strong employee relations can enhance shareholder value and firm 
performance in domestic takeovers, labor-related frictions in cross-border takeovers may limit the 
extent to which a firm’s engagement towards employee satisfaction can be translated into employee 
productivity and shareholder value. This is essentially a supply-side argument (i.e., the acquiring firm 
“supplies” generous employment policies). 
On the demand side, talented employees with many outside options and high mobility may 
demand more generous employment policies that may be crucial in order to retain their talent (in both 
the acquiring and target firms) and maintain their productivity in an M&A deal. But providing similarly 
generous employment packages to those without sufficient outside options and mobility may be 
perceived as a waste of money from the acquirer shareholders’ perspective. A firm’s employee-
engagement may therefore be an equilibrium outcome reflecting the supply of generous employment 
policies by the firm and the demand for good treatment by employees. The value implications for 
shareholders depend on which forces (the supply- versus the demand-side considerations) carry most 
weight. 
Based on a global sample of 2,009 acquiring firms from 48 countries engaging in 4,565 M&A 
deals, we find that there is considerable heterogeneity in firm-level policies of and investment in 
employee relations that are distinct from state-imposed country-level labor regulations. We show that 
the acquirer’s employee-engagement in terms of monetary benefits and job security is positively related 
to the takeover deal’s announcement returns and long-term performance when acquiring a domestic 
target, but that this effect reverses when acquiring a foreign target. A one-standard deviation increase 




deals, but results in a 43 basis point decrease in cross-border deals.4 This finding holds even after 
controlling for cross-country differences in labor regulations and other macroeconomic factors, as 
well as acquirer-level fixed effects in a sample of firms that acquire both domestically and 
internationally during our sample period, indicating our results are not driven by time-invariant 
acquirer characteristics. In addition, we show that it does not stem from the fact that cross-border 
deals on average destroy value as these deals have higher announcement returns than domestic deals. 
Moreover, the results on long-run post-merger performance are in line with those from the CARs 
estimations, potentially suggesting that the market can correctly predict the effect of employee-
engagement on deal success. We also show that our findings are mainly driven by the acquirer’s 
investment in pecuniary incentives and monetary compensation, and less so by factors representing 
job security factors such as employment retention and trade union relations, consistent with human 
relations theories (Herzberg 1959, 1964, 1966).  
We also explore a few potential channels through which labor-related frictions in cross-border 
acquisitions may affect the relationship between employee-engagement and deal performance. We 
show that the negative effect of strong employee relations in cross-border deals is weakened when the 
acquirer has takeover experience in the target’s country, when social norms in the target country more 
strongly value money, when economic nationalism in the target’s country and strong labor unions in 
the acquirer’s and target’s countries are absent, and when both parties are in low-tech industries, all of 
which can reduce labor-related frictions in cross-border deals. 
We further show that, for a subsample of deals for which we have both acquirer and target data 
on employee-engagement, our results are not likely to be driven by the target’s employee-engagement. 
We also rule out several alternative explanations including other workplace-related dimensions (such 
as workforce diversity, health and safety, or training and development), the levels of or differences in 
country-level labor regulations, an acquirer’s tendency of engaging in domestic or cross-border M&As, 
                                                           
4 These effects are economically significant as three-day acquirer CARs range between -50 and +50 basis 




geographical distance between acquirer and target, differences in their countries’ economic 
development, the target employees’ receptiveness towards job security incentives, or a back-firing 
effect of acquirer’s over-engaging in employee relations. Our results are robust when excluding serial 
acquirers, targets from developing countries, or US acquirers, and when using an instrumental variable 
(IV) approach with the salaries and wage expenses in the acquirer’s peers as an IV for employment 
quality. Overall, our findings highlight the importance of firm-level engagement and investment in 
employee-related issues to explain the marked differences in deal performance and shareholder value 
redistribution between domestic and cross-border M&As around the world. 
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section II describes our data and methods, 
while Section III presents the main empirical results. Section IV presents the robustness tests and 
discusses several alternative explanations. Section V concludes.  
 
II. Data and Methodology 
II.1. Data 
We measure a firm’s employee-engagement using data from Thomson Reuters’ ASSET4 
Environmental, Social, and Corporate Governance (ESG) database. This firm-level database provides 
information and ratings on firms’ practice on social, corporate governance, economic, and 
environmental issues (“pillars”) and covers more than 4,000 companies worldwide, including the 
members of the S&P 500, Russell 1000, NASDAQ 100, MSCI Europe, FTSE 250, ASX 300, STOXX 
600, the MSCI World Index, and the MSCI Emerging Market, index since 2002. The ASSET4 data is 
obtained from publicly available sources such as annual reports, 10-K statements, and CSR reports, 
which reduces concerns regarding self-reporting biases that may be present in survey-based data. The 
ASSET4 ratings consist of more than 750 ESG sub-dimensions (data points). Every data point results 
from a multi-step verification process, including a series of data entry checks, automated quality rules, 




performance indicators and are rated as both a normalized score (0 to 100, with 50 as the industry 
mean) and the actual computed value. The equally-weighted average is then normalized by ASSET4 
so that each firm is given a score relative to the performance of all firms in the same industry around 
the world. All ratings are provided on a yearly basis. For all companies, at least three years of history 
are available, and most companies are covered from 2005 onward. Firms are rated on the basis of their 
ESG compliance (regulatory requirements) and their ESG engagement (voluntary initiatives). 
Therefore, the ESG ratings reflect a comprehensive evaluation of how a firm engages in stakeholder 
issues and complies with regulations. 
Our main focus is on the variables related to the firm’s workforce under the “social” (“S”) pillar, 
in particular those describing the firms’ commitment and effectiveness with regard to the provision 
of high-quality employment benefits and job security, which we label as Employment Quality. 
Employment Quality is an equally-weighted average of a set of underlying elements. It consists of 
measures of the firm’s salary level, wage distribution, trade union relations, bonus plans for at least 
middle management, fringe benefits such as health insurance provision, employment awards, 
employment creation, personnel turnover, lay-offs, management departures, strikes, job security 
policies, and employment controversies in the media such as strikes. This way we can test the 
importance the aggregate measure of employment quality, but also go one level deeper and test the 
monetary incentive factors as well as job security factors on shareholder returns around M&A 
announcements. As employment quality is the main empirical proxy for an acquirer’s employee-
engagement, we use these two terms interchangeably throughout the paper. 
The Employment Quality score is, as are all other ESG scores mentioned above, normalized by 
ASSET4 such that each firm is given a z-score relative to the performance of all firms in the same 
industry. The normalization to a scale of 100 implies that, by construction, firms with scores higher 
than 50 perform above the median in terms of employee-engagement. These measures enable us to 
assess a firm’s orientation towards employee issues relative to the industry benchmark, and provide 




way, we can compare corporate employee-engagement across firms with a similar demand for labor 
skills and operating in similar labor markets but with a different geographical focus in takeovers.  
We obtain data on M&A deals from the SDC Mergers and Acquisitions database. In order to be 
included in our sample, the transactions should meet the following criteria: (1) the deal was announced 
between January 1st, 2002 and December 31st, 2014 and the SDC database contains detailed 
information on this transaction;5 (2) the acquiring firm is publicly listed and its accounting and stock 
return data are available in Datastream; (3) the acquiring firm owns less than 50% of the target’s shares 
before the offer and makes an offer with the intention to own more than 50% of the target’s shares 
subsequent to a successful acquisition; (4) the acquiring firm has data available in ASSET4 for the 
fiscal year before the deal announcement; and (5) labor protection data for both the acquirer’s and 
target’s countries are available in the Botero et al. (2004) labor regulation indices. 
Merging the information from ASSET4 with our sample of M&A deals from SDC results in a 
final sample of 4,565 deals by 2,009 acquiring firms from 48 countries. Of these deals, 2,550 (56%) 
are domestic and 2,015 (44%) are cross-border. The descriptions of our key variables are given in 
Appendix A. Appendix B shows the sample distribution by acquirer industry and year. The acquiring 
firms in our sample are mostly active in Business Services (10%), Trading (8%), and Banking (7%) 
industries6. Appendix C shows the sample distribution by acquirer country. Acquiring firms originate 
mainly from the US (27%), Japan (15%), and the UK (13%). In addition, Appendices D1 and D2 
respectively offer an overview of our employee-engagement scores by country and industry. 
II.2. Empirical Strategy 
To assess shareholders’ reactions to M&A announcements and thus draw inferences on 
shareholder value, we calculate cumulative abnormal stock returns (CARs) for the acquiring firm in 
the three days surrounding the deal announcement [-1,+1], where abnormal returns are defined as the 
                                                           
5 It is not meaningful to include the deals announced before 2002 as the ASSET4 coverage starts in 2002. 
6 To keep a sufficiently large number of observations, we do not exclude the financials and utilities industries. 





difference between the firm’s actual and expected returns. These expected returns are obtained from 
the market model estimated over a period starting 100 days before the announcement date until 30 
days before this date:  =∝+  ∗ 	 + 
, where  is the actual return for firm i on day t, and 
	 is the return on the primary stock market of the country in which the firm’s headquarter is located. 
The estimated coefficients enable us to calculate the returns expected for the case without a takeover 
offer. We then calculate the CARs by summing the abnormal returns in the three days around the 
announcement date. We necessarily focus on the acquiring firms’ CARs because studying the 
combined CARs of both acquirers and targets makes us lose more than 80% of our sample (as the 
number of public target firms in our sample is limited). Similarly, we confine our analysis to the 
acquiring firms’ employee relations, as the availability of data for firm-level employee-engagement and 
stock information for target firms is also very limited (less than 10% of the sample).7 Our core 
specification is: 
		[−1,+1]
=  +  	!"#"!$%,& + '
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where Employee Engagement.j,t-1 measures the acquiring firm’s investment in employee quality in 
terms of monetary benefits and job security for the fiscal year prior to the deal announcement, and Xij 
indicates a set of standard deal- and firm-level control variables including acquirer ROA, acquirer 
leverage, acquirer size, a serial acquirer dummy, relative deal size, and dummies for toeholds, multiple 
bidders, all-cash financed deals, hostile deals, diversifying deals, and public targets. Lab. Reg. Indexc is 
a set of four (target and/or acquirer) country-level labor regulation indices from Botero et al. (2004), 
which have been widely used in studies on the role of labor protection in corporate investment (e.g. 
Atanassov and Kim, 2009; Levine et al., 2015). These indices consist of (1) an employment laws index, 
which measures the protection of labor and employment contracts; (2) a collective relations laws index, 
which measures the statutory protection and power of labor unions as well as protection of workers 
                                                           
7 We however perform an additional test for the subsample for which we have ASSET4 information for both 




during collective disputes; (3) a social security laws index, which measures social security benefits 
related to old age, disability, death, sickness, and unemployment; and (4) a civil rights index, which 
captures the degree of statutory protection of vulnerable groups against employment discrimination. 
As our goal is to examine the role of firm-level employee-engagement, it is important to control for 
these country-level labor regulation variables so as to disentangle the firm-level effects of (voluntary) 
labor-orientation from the effects resulting from country-level (mandatory) labor protection 
regulations. Finally, γ is a set of year, acquirer- and target-industry fixed effects, and “acquirer-region 
× target-region” fixed effects that we include to further reduce concerns related to a potential omitted 
variable bias in the relationship between corporate employee-engagement and stock returns around 
M&A announcements.  
In addition, we explore the potential mechanisms that account for the differential relations 
between employee-engagement and shareholder returns in domestic and cross-border deals by 
considering a set of sub-dimensional factors of our main Employment Quality score (e.g. monetary 
incentives such as bonus plans for at least middle management, fringe benefits such as health insurance, 
the wage ratio of employees/CEO, trade union relations policies, employment growth/loss, job 
security policies, etc.). We also interact these employee-engagement measures with country- and firm-
level variables that capture labor-related frictions. Definitions of all variables are available in Appendix 
A.  
III. Results 
III.1. Descriptive Statistics 
Panel A in Table 1 reports descriptive statistics for our main measure of firm-level employee-
engagement for the acquiring firms in domestic and cross-border deals, respectively. Our main 
explanatory variable on firm-level employee-engagement is Employment Quality in terms of monetary 
incentives and job security. It is measured by means of industry-adjusted normalized scores (ranging 
from 0 to 100) and captures a firm’s engagement relative to its industry peers. In domestic deals, 




higher than the sample mean. The difference of 9 points on a scale of 100 is both economically and 
statistically significant (Table 1, Panel A). The other variables shown in Panel A represent a set of sub-
dimensional factors used to construct the Employment Quality score (see Appendix A for variable 
descriptions); in domestic deals, an average of 39% of the acquiring firms offer a bonus plan to their 
employees, 43% provide fringe benefits such as pension funds or health insurance, the average 
acquirer increased its workforce by 3.5% in the year prior to the acquisition, 18% of the acquiring 
firms has a policy in place for maintaining good relations with trade unions, and 6% of firms have 
policy to enhance job security. In contrast, acquirers engaging in cross-border deals are more likely to 
offer a bonus plan to their employees (48%), are more likely to have a policy for maintaining good 
relations with trade unions (32%), and are more likely to have a job security policy in place (11%). 
Overall, these results suggest that firms conducting cross-border acquisitions are different from those 
conducting domestic acquisitions in terms of their relations with employees, and also appear to have 
above-average employee-engagement. 
Panel B reports descriptive statistics for deal-level characteristics, starting with the acquirer’s 
CARs over the window [-1, 1]. Consistent with findings in the literature, acquirer shareholders in 
domestic deals do not gain from M&A deals: the mean and median CARs are -25 and -22 basis points, 
respectively. About 41% of our sample consists of cross-border deals, and in these deals acquirer 
shareholders earn positive mean and median returns of 16 and 3 basis points, respectively. Although 
shareholders of acquirers conducting cross-border deals earn more positive returns on average, the 
median return is close to zero. Cross-border acquirers are less likely to acquire public targets, make 
all-cash offers, and acquire toehold stakes. Cross-border deal values are comparable to domestic deal 
values (16% of the acquirer’s market capitalization in cross-border deals and 17% in domestic deals). 
The firm-level variables in Panel C show that firms acquiring domestically are comparable to firms 
acquiring cross-border targets in terms of leverage and profitability (as, although the difference in 




be serial acquirers8. Panels D and E compare the acquirer’s and target’s country-level labor protection 
indices: acquiring firms in domestic deals tend to be located in countries with slightly lower protection 
in terms of employment, collective relations, and social security, but with stronger civil rights than 
acquiring firms in cross-border deals. Also, targets in cross-border deals have a higher employment 
laws index than acquirers in domestic deals. These statistics are consistent with Alimov (2015). 
[ Insert Table 1 about here ] 
We can derive some interesting insights from our descriptive statistics: compared to acquirers in 
domestic deals, those engaging in cross-border deals have on average more generous employment 
policies at the firm-level, and their deals also earn higher announcement returns compared to domestic 
acquirers.  However, they also differ on a number of deal-, firm-, and country-level characteristics. It 
is thus not clear whether the higher announcement returns in cross-border deals are causally related 
to stronger employee-engagement, which as we will show below, is in fact not likely the case.   
We also show similar descriptive statistics for target firms, but only for the small subsample for 
which employee-engagement data are available, as ASSET4 mostly covers large firms included in the 
major global equity indices. Again, target firms’ Employment Quality score is higher for cross-border 
deals than for domestic deals. Consistent with the M&A literature, target firms also enjoy positive 
announcement CARs, which are higher for cross-border deals. Targets are smaller in size compared 
to acquirers, but they are more profitable. The relative deal size is much larger in this small subsample 
compared to the full sample in Table 1, which is of course due to ASSET4 only covering large publicly-
listed firms. Overall, the descriptive statistics in Tables 1 and 2 indicate that there are substantial 
differences in employee-engagement and firm characteristics between acquirers and targets, and 
between domestic deals and cross-border deals. 
                                                           
8 A serial acquiring firm is defined as a firm engaging in more than 10 takeover deals across our sample period. 
Alternatively, when we define serial acquirers as firms engaging in more than two takeover deals per year, our 
conclusions are not affected. A relatively large number of deals– they make up 25% of our sample – involve 




[ Insert Table 2 about here ] 
III.2. Employee-Engagement and Shareholder Returns in Domestic and Cross-Border Takeovers 
We now formally test the relations between firm-level employee-engagement and acquirer 
returns. As we argue above, a firm’s engagement towards its employees’ welfare can increase employee 
productivity and support, leading to higher shareholder value, partially reflected in higher stock returns 
at the firm’s acquisition announcement. However, such a positive incentive effect can be attenuated 
if the acquisition takes place across national borders, due to the labor-related frictions regarding the 
transfer and integration of employment policies. We test this hypothesis in Table 3, where we consider 
two subsamples for domestic and cross-border deals in Panel A, and interact a cross-border deal 
dummy with the firm’s Employment Quality score on the full sample in Panel B. Using these two types 
of models enables us to include different types of fixed effects that would otherwise absorb, for 
example, the cross-border deal indicator. All specifications include the firm- and deal-level controls 
specified in Section II (acquirer ROA, leverage, size, a serial acquirer indicator, relative deal size, and 
dummies for toeholds, multiple bidders, all-cash financed deals, hostile deals, diversifying deals, and 
public targets), along with acquirer and target country-level labor protection indices or country fixed 
effects, and year, acquirer- and target-industry, and acquirer region by target region fixed effects.  
Models (1) and (2) in Panel A indicate that a higher level of employment quality in terms of 
monetary incentives and job security is positively related to shareholder returns around domestic deal 
announcements. This is consistent with the notion that providing monetary incentives increases 
employees’ productivity, which we show may be reflected in increased shareholder returns around 
domestic M&A announcements. When turning to cross-border deals, we find that the effect becomes 
reversed. In Models (3) through (6), we consistently find that higher levels of employment quality are 
negatively related to CARs. Importantly, we find that this effect is not eroded by the inclusion of 
acquirer region-by-target region or even acquirer country-by-target country fixed effects. This suggests 
that the effect is not driven by, for example, time-invariant agreements or capital flows between a pair 




the full sample of deals, and interact Employment Quality with a cross-border deal indicator. The results 
in Models (1) through (6) are consistently in line with those in Panel A: stronger employee relations 
in the acquirer are positively related to announcement CARs in domestic deals, but negatively in cross-
border deals. These models also consistently show that cross-border deals earn higher CARs, in line 
with findings in the extant literature (e.g., Doukas and Travlos, 1988; Chari, Ouimet and Tesar, 2010). 
Importantly, we find that our results hold after controlling for acquirer and target country fixed effects 
(Model (2)), acquirer region by target region fixed effects (Model (4)), and even acquirer firm fixed 
effects (Models (5) and (6)). The former two specifications indicate that our results are unlikely to be 
driven by acquirer or target level labor regulations. Whereas Model (5) includes acquirer fixed effects 
for the full sample, Model (6) only considers acquirers that engaged in both domestic and cross-border 
acquisitions over the sample period. Notably, the finding that the negative effect in cross-border deals 
holds even in Model (6) suggests that our results are not likely to be driven by time-invariant acquirer 
characteristics, i.e., acquirers with strong employee relations that acquire domestically may be 
inherently different from those that acquire internationally. In terms of economic significance, a one 
standard deviation increase (+ 30) in the acquirer’s score on Employment Quality is associated with an 
increase in CARs of 0.21% (21 bps) in domestic deals, but the increase in returns around cross-border 
deals drops from 1.16% to 0.92% (a 24 bps decrease) in Model (4).9  Combining these results, we can 
conclude that, despite the summary statistics in Table 1 indicating that cross-border acquirers have 
higher levels of employee-engagement and experience on average higher announcement returns, these 
higher returns are not likely to result from the acquirer’s stronger employee-engagement. Instead, they 
are consistent with the notion that acquiring across national borders induces labor-related frictions 
that potentially reduce labor productivity gains for shareholders, which is priced by the stock market 
around such deals. 
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It is important to note that we control in all specifications for labor regulations in the acquirer’s 
and—in cross-border deals—also the target’s country, in addition to acquirer region by target region 
fixed effects. In line with Dessaint et al. (2017), we find that in domestic deals a country’s labor laws 
regarding employment regulation (which to a large extent measures the labor rigidity faced by a firm) 
are negatively related to announcement returns. 10  However, the inclusion of country-level labor 
regulation indices does not erode the significance of our firm-specific employment quality score. This 
suggests that government-imposed labor protection regulations are not perfect substitutes for 
voluntary employment policies at the firm level. In addition, the signs and significance for our other 
control variables are comparable to those found in the literature (e.g. Lin, Officer, and Zou, 2011): 
acquiring a public target negatively affects the returns to shareholders, whereas most firm-level 
characteristics and the financial performance of acquirers do not seem to play a significant role in 
driving the acquirer’s own returns. In our robustness tests, we additionally control for, and interact 
our employee-engagement variables with, the acquirer’s and target’s country GDP and GDP per capita, 
as well as other country-level characteristics. None of these controls affects the significance of our 
measure of employee-engagement.  
[ Insert Table 3 about Here ] 
III.3. Unbundling Employee Incentives 
Next, we investigate the mechanisms underlying our above-documented effects of employment 
quality. Our aim is to analyze whether there are labor-related frictions arising from acquiring a target 
across national borders that alter the role of corporate employee-engagement. As documented both 
theoretically (Herzberg et al., 1959) and empirically (Edmans, 2011), employees are motivated most 
by the provision of monetary incentives which may augment their productivity which may in turn be 
reflected in the shareholder value. Therefore, our results are expected to be mainly driven by factors 
related to the provision of monetary incentives. To test this hypothesis, we dig deeper into the 
                                                           




ASSET4 database and we decompose Employment Quality into two broad categories capturing 
employees’ monetary incentives (including fair salaries, bonus plans, and other fringe benefits such as 
health insurance) on the one hand and job security incentives (including growth in the workforce, 
trade union relations, and the presence of a job security policy) on the other hand. The former set of 
incentives represent how much the firm values the specificity of human assets (Williamson, 1981), and 
thus can increase employee productivity by linking compensation to firm performance, providing a 
fair wage, attracting talented employees, and encouraging diligence. The latter set of incentives is 
directly related to employee loyalty and commitment and is thus a more direct measure of the 
employment insurance dimension of employee relations. 11 They represent the collective governance 
of human assets which are not necessarily employee-specific, and may not directly translate into 
superior labor productivity (Williamson, 1981).  
We test these decomposed employee-engagement measures in Table 4. In Panel A, we consider 
three forms of monetary incentives: (i) the provision of a bonus plan to at least middle management 
(Acquirer Bonus Plan Dummy), (ii) the provision of fringe benefits such as pension funds and health 
insurance (Acquirer Fringe Benefits Dummy), and (iii) the wage ratio of the average worker’s salary and 
the CEO’s income (Acquirer Wage Ratio Employees/CEO).12 We include the latter based on the argument 
that a smaller wage gap is likely to increase employees’ perception of being paid a fair wage, which 
may increase their productivity. As before, we interact these monetary incentive variables with the 
cross-border indicator. In line with theory and empirical evidence, we find that each of our monetary 
incentive variables is positively related to acquirer announcement returns and hence shareholder value. 
In addition, echoing our results in Table 3, cross-border deals, which arguably may entail more labor-
related frictions, seem to limit the extent to which these incentives can be translated into productivity 
and firm value. Employee compensation schemes differ significantly across countries (e.g., Card, 
                                                           
11 This classification conceptually matches the dichotomy by Herzberg et al. (1959) who distinguish between 
“motivational” factors (such as monetary incentives) and “maintenance” factors (such as job retention policies 
and improving working conditions). 




Heining, and Kline, 2013; Mueller, Ouimet, and Simintzi, 2017) and an overly generous compensation 
policy for all employees with different backgrounds and cultural values may distort workforce 
incentives in general (Mueller et al., 2017). Moreover, in line with Herzberg’s theory that job security 
does not directly lead to superior performance, we find no significant effects for the provision of job 
security incentives on shareholder CARs in Panel B. We measure job security incentives by (i) whether 
or not the firm has a trade union relations policy (Acquirer Trade Union Relations Policy), (ii) employment 
growth (Acquirer Net Employment Creation), and (iii) whether the firm has a job security policy (Acquirer 
Job Security Policy). 13  This potentially indicates that the labor-related frictions only constrain the 
transformation of monetary incentives in productivity and shareholder value, whereas they do not 
matter much for the employment insurance dimension. This is not unsurprising, as earlier evidence 
has indicated that employment protection and insurance in cross-border M&As is generally affected 
by country-level labor regulations (Dessaint et al., 2017). What we document here are firm-level 
voluntary incentivizing policies going beyond labor protection and regulation that only provide 
employees with a safety net. 
[ Insert Table 4 about here ] 
IV.4. Labor-Related Frictions in Cross-Border Deals: Channels 
We now delve deeper into the channels of labor-related frictions in cross-border deals. In other 
words, what types of frictions may account for the negative interaction effects shown in Table 3? 
Relative to domestic deals, cross-border deals are considerably more complex transactions which make 
the integration of firms with different employee policies and different national, cultural, and 
organizational contexts more difficult (Aguilera and Dencker, 2004). In this section, we attempt to 
identify the channels through which such difficulties arise or the contexts that facilitate the transfer 
and integration of employee policies. In particular, we focus on seven variables at the firm-level, 
                                                           
13 In addition, we test a set of alternative variables related to job security (not reported): the percentage of trade 
unionization in the acquirer firm, the rate of turnover in the workforce, and the number of labor-related 




industry-level, and the country-level, and interact them with Employment Quality for the subsample of 
cross-border deals, as reported in Table 5. Again, all variable descriptions are given in Appendix A. 
As before, we find in each specification that the main effect of employment quality is significantly 
negative.14  
The first variable captures whether or not the transaction is a repeat acquisition in the target’s 
country. Repeatedly acquiring firms in the same country familiarizes the acquirer with the target’s 
country’s employment cultures and labor market, which reduces information asymmetry and makes 
the transfer and integration of its employee policies more efficient. As shown in Model (1) of Table 5, 
while the coefficient on Employment Quality is negative, the interaction term “Acquirer Employment 
Quality t-1 × Repeat Acquisition” is positive and statistically significant at the 5% level, supporting the 
above argument. In economic terms, a 30 point increase in Employment Quality (one standard deviation) 
increases CARs by 0.18% if the acquirer has acquisition experience in the target’s country, relative to 
a -0.33% decrease if this were not the case. 
Second, following our earlier hypothesis and the evidence that employee-engagement mainly 
functions via the provision of monetary incentives, we conjecture that cultures and norms on labor 
compensation can constitute another form of friction. Therefore, in Model (2), we consider the target 
country’s remuneration culture regarding the importance of ‘good pay’. When there is a similar or 
better attitude towards monetarily incentivizing employees in the target’s country, it will be easier for 
the acquirer to implement in the target firm the same incentivizing policies that can effectively enhance 
employee productivity. We obtain the data on the country-level “Importance of Good Pay” from the 
World Value Survey, and consider the case in which people in the target’s country have a higher 
predilection for good pay in their job relative to those in the acquirer’s country. This predilection 
could signal the potential effectiveness of introducing or maintaining monetary incentives for 
employees in the target firm to acquiring firms’ shareholders. The positive interaction of “Acquirer 
                                                           





Employment Quality × (Target Country > Acq. Country ‘Good Pay is Important’)” in Model (2) supports this 
argument. In deals where the target’s country has a higher predilection for good pay, the negative 
effect of employment quality is reversed. 
The third variable of Table 5 captures the attitude towards saving in the target’s country, which 
should again only be related to monetary incentives and less so to job security incentives. It indicates 
whether people in the target’s country attach more importance to saving money relative to people in 
the acquirer’s country. An acquiring firm may more easily transfer and integrate monetary incentive 
policies to countries where people think saving money is relatively important (or value the possession 
of money more). This is supported by the positive interaction of “Acquirer Employment Quality × (Target 
Country > Acq. Country ‘Saving is Important’)” in Model (3). A one standard deviation increase in 
Employment Quality increases CARs from -0.81% to -0.21% when acquiring a target firm in such a 
country.  
The fourth variable captures the absence of economic nationalism in the target country’s 
government as, in the inverse case foreign acquirers face more resistance from target countries’ 
governments who may fear that foreign acquirers will infringe national interests and that corporate 
restructuring result in massive lay-offs in the target firm. If such “economic nationalism” is low, 
foreign acquirers with better employee relations may face less political opposition and hence less labor-
related frictions such that transposing their employment policies to the target is likely to be more 
effective than in the case with stronger protectionist attitudes. We follow Dinc and Erel (2013) and 
use the ruling of a liberal government (a dummy variable indicating whether the ruling government is 
right-wing; data obtained from the Database of Political Institutions) in the target’s country to proxy 
for the absence of economic nationalism, as (rightwing-)liberal parties usually and traditionally favor 
more free trade (Dinc and Erel, 2013). This argument is supported by the positive coefficient on the 
interaction term “Acquirer Employment Quality t-1 × (Absence of Economic Nationalism in Target Country)” 
in Model (4), which indicates that the absence of strong economic nationalism reduces the effect of 




The fifth variable is the perceived strength of labor unions in the acquirer and target’s country. 
The rationale is that strong labor unions increase contract rigidity and difficulty in negotiating with 
employees. Therefore, low union strength in the target’s country (as perceived by the acquirer) 
indicates the relative ease with which acquirers can restructure and implement post-merger 
employment policies in line with those in the acquiring firm. Of course, if in the acquirer country there 
are strong labor unions, the employees of the acquiring firm may attempt to resist such 
implementation of favorable employment policies in the target firm as this may shift resources from 
the acquirer’s to the target’s employees. We therefore specifically consider the case in which both the 
acquirer and target countries’  have low perceived union strength (“low” is defined as being in the 
bottom tercile of the distribution), where perceived union strength is measured by “Confidence in 
Unions”, also from the World Value Survey. As shown in Model (5), the interaction term “Acquirer 
Employment Quality × (Acquirer and Target Country Low Union Strength)” has a positive loading, suggesting 
that the negative effect of employee-engagement in cross-border deal becomes less negative when 
both acquirer and target country have low perceived union strength. 
In Model (6), we test whether employee policies are more easily transferred and integrated in the 
case of low-tech deals (in which target and acquirer are both in low-tech industries), relative to deals 
in which at least one of the parties is in a high-tech industry. High-tech industries are fast-changing 
and more complex than traditional low-tech industries, especially in terms of incentivizing and 
motivating employees (Eyob, 1994). We thus expect that transferring and integrating employee 
policies in a high-tech target is more difficult, as in such industries corporate culture or the reputation 
of the employer may be more important than purely monetary incentives (see e.g. Focke, Maug and 
Niessen-Runzi, 2016). In low-tech deals on the other hand, there should be less labor-related frictions 
that limit the extent to which monetary incentives can be transferred. As shown in Model (6), “Acquirer 
Employment Quality × Low-Tech deal” is significantly positive, indicating that acquirer shareholders react 
more positively to cross-border deals undertaken by high-employment quality acquirers that engage 




provision of employment quality (the supply-side) from the argument based on employee mobility 
(the demand-side). Understandably, employees in high-tech industries are more mobile and have more 
outside options, which entails that the acquirer’s employment quality is more important in these high-
tech deals so as to retain talent (demand-side), but our findings are the opposite. The fact that the 
effect of employment quality is more pronounced in low-tech deals suggest that the supply-side factors 
outweigh demand-side factors in this setting.  
Overall, the results in Table 5 identify specific contexts in which the integration and transfer of 
employment policies across borders is easier and less costly, such that negative effect of employee 
quality in cross-border M&As becomes weaker and can be even completely off-set. Combining this 
with the fact that cross-border deals usually achieve higher abnormal returns, our results indicate that 
the negative interaction between employment quality and cross-border deals as found in Table 3 is 
not due to a deal being cross-border per se. Instead, there appears to be a unique aspect of cross-
border deals that is related to the inability of firms to efficiently transform monetary incentives in 
higher shareholder value in a foreign target firm.  
[ Insert Table 5 about here ] 
IV.5. Employee-Engagement and Post-Merger Performance 
Measuring short-run CARs around merger announcements of course does not paint a complete 
picture regarding a deal’s performance. Therefore, in this section we investigate the effect of 
employment quality on the acquirer’s long-run post-merger performance. That is, we investigate 
whether the labor-related frictions in cross-border deals that, as we argue, limit the extent to which 
monetary incentives can be transformed into employee productivity indeed reduce post-merger 
employee productivity and firm performance in the long run. We measure long-run performance using 
the acquirer’s industry-adjusted returns on assets (ROA), return on sales (ROS), and employee 
productivity (Sales/Employees) two years after the completion of the takeover. We follow the 
approach in Harford, Humphery-Jenner, and Powell (2012), and include the acquirer’s industry-




a higher Employment Quality score increases the average post-merger industry-adjusted ROA in 
domestic deals, whereas it decreases the post-merger profitability in cross-border deals. These effects 
translate into an increase in post-merger ROA of 0.41% for a one standard-deviation increase in 
Employment Quality in domestic deals. Although cross-border deals on average show an increase in 
post-merger ROA, having a one standard-deviation higher level of Employment Quality in such deals 
decreases the post-merger profitability by 0.30%. We find similar but weaker results for the post-
merger industry-adjusted ROS in Model (2), and Model (3) shows that an increase in Employment Quality 
results in a decrease in post-merger labor productivity in cross-border deals but not in domestic deals. 
This suggests that markets correctly anticipate the deal’s performance at the merger announcement, 
and reinforces the validity of our measure that captures labor-related frictions affecting the 
transformation of incentivizing employees towards more productivity and firm performance.  
[ Insert Table 6 about here ] 
IV.6. The Role of the Target Firm’s Employee-Engagement 
One could wonder whether our above results are driven by the target’s employee-engagement, 
rather than the acquirer’s employee-engagement. Empirically this is a difficult question because we 
have relatively few data on the targets’ employment quality scores in the ASSET4 database. ASSET4 
mainly covers large firms included in the major global equity indices, so most (small) targets do not 
receive a rating from ASSET4. Nevertheless, we conduct tests on a subsample of deals with 
employment quality data available for both the target and the acquiring firm (362 deals in total). We 
classify both the acquirer’s and the target’s Employee Quality scores into high- and low-groups (“high” 
or “low” refers to the employment quality score being above or below the sample median). We then 
interact the cross-border dummy with different combinations of the acquirer’s and target’s 
employment quality scores such that we concentrate on four subsamples based on a two-by-two 
matrix capturing high/low scores by acquirers/targets, as shown in Table 7. We first investigate each 
dimension separately in Models (1) – (3), and combine them in Model (4) (the “Acquirer Low, Target 




exclusively valid for those cases with an above-median level of employment quality in the acquirer, 
regardless of the target’s employment quality score. In other words, the target’s employee-engagement 
does not seem to affect the impact of the enhanced employee incentives of the acquirer and the labor-
related frictions that we identify. Of course, these results should be interpreted with caution as they 
come from a relatively small subsample. 
[ Insert Table 7 about here ] 
In the next section, we investigate the robustness of our results by performing a placebo test and 
an instrumental variable test, and we rule out a large set of alternative stories. 
 
IV. Robustness and Alternative Explanations 
IV.1. Placebo Test on Employee Engagement 
Are our results unique to the employment quality measure, or are the relations hardwired in the 
rating metrics of the ASSET4 database? In Table 8, we show results for a placebo test in which we 
investigate alternative dimensions of employee relations that are not related to the provision of 
monetary incentives and which should not be affected by labor-related frictions that affect firms’ 
abilities to incentivize employees to increase their productivity and shareholder value. Model (1) 
repeats our analysis in Model (4) of Panel B in Table 3, which we show here as a benchmark. Models 
(2)-(4) show the results for 3 alternative dimensions of employee relations, namely Workforce Health & 
Safety, Workforce Diversity, and Training & Development. We combine them with Employment Quality in 
Model (5). We find that only Employment Quality is significantly related to CARs, which supports our 
argument that we capture labor-related frictions that affect monetary incentives but no other 




incentivized by benefits in terms of monetary compensation, than by the improvement of their 
working environment or workforce diversity (Herzberg et al., 1959).15  
[ Insert Table 8 about here ] 
IV.2. The Role of Labor Regulations  
A large fraction of the literature on the role of human capital in M&As focuses on the effects of 
country-level labor regulations. To rule out that our results are driven by cross-country differences in 
for example employment protection regulations, we have already included country by country fixed 
effects or acquirer and target country labor regulations indices, and acquirer region by target region 
fixed effects. However, one may still argue that we do not fully capture such regulatory issues and that 
the negative coefficient on employment quality in cross-border deals simply reflects “regulatory 
arbitrage” (Alimov (2015)) or rigidity of labor regulations in the target country. We therefore explore 
how an acquiring firm’s employee relations investment, captured by our Employment Quality variable, 
interacts with differences in state-imposed labor regulations between its home country and the target’s 
country. If the strength of labor regulations at the country-level does shape firm-level employee-
engagement, we expect the interaction terms to be significant. We capture labor regulation in the 
acquirer’s country and target’s country by using the indices developed in Botero et al. (2004) and taking 
the differences in the index values of the two countries. In Table 9, we find that none of the interaction 
terms is significant, suggesting that the cross-country differences in labor regulation do not explain 
the negative CARs for firms with strong employee quality scores in cross-border deals.  
[ Insert Table 9 about here ] 
Another alternative explanation for our main findings is that our cross-border results are driven 
by the fact that firms acquiring targets in countries with stronger labor regulations face higher 
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In addition, when we run similar tests on other ASSET4 Social Pillar scores and Environmental Pillar scores 





restructuring and integration costs due to the rigidity of laws (Levine et al., 2015). That is, the negative 
coefficient of firm-level Employment Quality could possibly capture the direct effect of (target) country-
level labor regulations. Although this is not likely the case because we control for acquirer and target 
country labor regulation indices in all regressions, we nevertheless regress the acquirer’s CARs on the 
separate acquirer’s and target’s country-level labor regulation indices (not taking differences as in Table 
9) to better understand the relative importance of imposed regulations and the firm’s choice of 
employment policies. In unreported results, we find that only the target and acquirer country’s 
employment law indices are significant determinants of acquirer CARs, in line with findings in Alimov 
(2015) and Dessaint et al. (2017). After adding our firm-level Employment Quality variable, we find that 
the country-level labor regulations coefficients remain significant, and that firm-level Employment 
Quality also remains highly significant. This indicates that our previous results on firm-level Employment 
Quality are not explained by country-level labor regulations. Although others have documented that 
labor market regulations and ownership structure are substitutive governance mechanisms (e.g., 
Bennedsen, Huang, Wagner, and Zeume, 2015), we show that this may not be the case for firm-level 
employment policies; firm- and country-level measures of employee policies capture different aspects 
and cannot be used as substitutes.    
IV.3. Other Alternative Explanations 
In Table 10, we further conduct several more tests to rule out other alternative explanations for 
our results that may be unrelated to labor-related frictions in cross-border M&As. First, the attenuating 
effect of cross-border deals that we identify may simply capture the geographical distance between the 
acquirer’s and target’s country. Although such an argument does not explain why only monetary 
incentives are affected, we  interact Employment Quality with an indicator of whether the geographical 
distance between the acquirer’s and target’s countries is above the sample median (Model (1)). Similarly, 
many have documented that the acquirer and target countries sharing a common language or a 
common border may explain the propensity and returns of cross-border deals. We therefore interact 




have a language in common (Model (2)), or a share a common border (Model (3)). Third, our results 
may also be driven by a difference in GDP per capita between the acquirer’s and the target’s countries. 
That is, if acquirers with strong employee relations are firms from high GDP per capita countries that 
acquire targets in low GDP per capita countries, it could be that it is such difference in economic 
development that drives the negative CARs around cross-border deals. We therefore interact 
Employment Quality with the difference between the two countries’ GDP per capita (in logarithm) 
(Model (4)). Fourth, the level of employee-engagement may be driven by the difference between the 
cultures of the target’s and the acquirer’s countries that are unrelated to labor issues (Ahern, Daminelli, 
and Fracassi, 2015). Hence, in Models (5) and (6), we interact the Employment Quality score with two 
World Value Survey variables capturing the difference between the acquirer’s and target’s countries in 
terms of people’s attitudes towards work. 16  We consider the percentage of people considering 
“Responsibility Is Important” and “Job Security Is Important.” The latter dimension is an important test, as 
we found that our results are almost exclusively driven by monetary incentives. Therefore, we should 
not expect to find that the relative importance of job security incentives induces labor-related frictions 
when acquiring a foreign target. As expected, we find that none of the above mentioned interactions 
have significant coefficients.  
IV.4. Frictions or Over-engagement? 
What remains unclear is whether the negative effect when acquiring a foreign target is the result 
of labor-related frictions specific to cross-border deals, or whether it results from simply over-
engaging in providing employee welfare which could be too costly and thus reduces firm value. The 
descriptive statistics in Panel A of Table 2 indicate that these two effects may coincide, and we need 
to disentangle them to further pin down the exact mechanism. Therefore, we consider an indicator 
for whether the acquirer’s Employment Quality score is above the score of 50 (larger than the industry 
average, which we consider as “over-engagement” in employee relations), but we investigate its effect 
                                                           





on the subsample of domestic deals only. If the over-engagement story holds, we expect a significant and 
negative coefficient of the “High Employment Quality” dummy in this subsample of domestic deals. The 
positive coefficient in Model (7) refutes this, and suggests that the negative effect of employee quality 
in cross-border deals does not arise from the acquirer over-engaging in employee relations in general. 
[ Insert Table 10 about here ] 
IV.5. Instrumental Variable Approach 
In earlier specifications, we have shown that our results are not likely to be driven by time-
invariant underlying characteristics of firms that acquire domestically or internationally (see Model (6) 
in Panel B of Table 3). In addition, it seems unlikely that acquirers adjust their level of employee quality 
because they may do a takeover bid in the next year. To reduce a potential omitted variable bias, we 
included industry, year, region by region, country by country, and acquirer firm fixed effects, along 
with a large number of control variables in our specifications. However, to further account for 
potential endogeneity issues from unobservable omitted variables, we perform a two-stage 
instrumental variable (IV) regression as a robustness test. Specifically, we use the acquirer’s industry 
peers’ average employee wages and benefits as an IV for Employment Quality. Whereas a firm’s expenses 
in terms of wages and benefits are influenced by the wage expenses by its industry peers (satisfying 
the relevance requirement of instrumental variables), it is unlikely that these expenses by industry peers 
affect the firm’s announcement returns directly or through channels other than the focal firm’s 
employment policies, thus satisfying the exclusion condition.17 Similar arguments on peer effects are 
made for other corporate policies such as capital structure (Leary and Roberts, 2014), corporate 
financial policies (Ferrell, Liang, and Renneboog, 2016), corporate social responsibility (Cao, Liang, 
and Zhan, 2016; Liang and Renneboog, 2016), and corporate culture (Fiordelisi, Li, Stentella-Lopes, 
and Ricci, 2016). We take the within-sample mean of the lagged employee salaries and benefits 
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score is adjusted for the firm’s global industry peers rather than its national peers, such local events should not 




expenses (as obtained from Worldscope) for the focal company’s peer firms by industry and by year 
(industry-year average) as the IV. The results for the first- and second-stage regressions are presented 
in Appendix E. We find that the industry peers’ average wage expenses are strongly positively related 
to Employment Quality and that using an IV approach does not affect our conclusions from Table 3: 
higher levels of employment quality (as predicted in the first stage) is positively related to CARs in 
domestic deals, and the effect again reverses in cross-border deals. This increases our confidence that 
the effects on shareholder value we have identified are indeed driven by the acquirer’s level of 
employee-engagement.  
IV.6. Other Robustness Tests 
We further conduct a few other sample-specific robustness tests. First, based on our sample 
distributions, one could argue that our results may be driven by US acquirers, as they make up 27% 
of our sample (Appendix C). In Appendix F, we repeat our results for a sample excluding US acquirers. 
We find that our results remain qualitatively unchanged, suggesting that we are identifying a global 
phenomenon. Similarly, our results may be driven a small subsample of serial acquiring firms that have 
radically different strategies for acquiring domestic versus foreign targets. Excluding serial acquiring 
firms also does not affect our results, however. Next, we investigate whether our results may be driven 
by a demand-side story in which employees demand for stronger monetary compensation with the 
threat that they may otherwise leave the firm. Although such an explanation is hard to reconcile with 
our earlier evidence, we test this by comparing subsamples of deals involving targets from OECD 
targets versus those from non-OECD targets. The costs of rewarding employees from targets in 
developing countries with strong monetary incentives may outweigh the benefits, as these employees 
are unlikely to have many outside options. They are thus unlikely to threaten to leave the firm if their 
demands are not met, such that the costs of providing strong incentives do not outweigh the benefits 
of retaining employees. We find that such an effect does not drive our results, as all our results appear 
in the sample consisting of OECD targets and not in the sample consisting of non-OECD targets. 




with a proxy for the firm’s reputation. We construct an indicator for whether the firm won an 
employee award as such firms likely have better reputations. In these firms, employees may not 
threaten to leave if their demands are not met as firm reputation acts as an incentive by itself. However, 
we find no significant effects, indicating that our results are more likely to be driven by a supply-side 
argument rather than a demand-side argument. 
We also examine whether a firm’s level of employee-engagement drives the returns around 
domestic and cross-border M&A deals through its effect on increasing/reducing the likelihood of 
engaging in a domestic versus a cross-border M&A. We use a Heckman selection model to estimate 
the relation between the firm’s employment quality and the likelihood of the firm embarking on a 
domestic versus a cross-border takeover transaction, conditional on the firm having decided on 
performing an M&A transaction. Gao and Ma (2016) and Ouimet and Zarutskie (2016) find that labor 
regulation is strongly related to takeover propensity. Our results, based on firm-level data (which go 
beyond the country-level regulations), show that a firm’s employment quality is positively related to 
engaging in M&A deals (in the first stage), but that the magnitudes are economically very small. In 
addition, the firm’s employee quality is not significantly related to the choice between domestic and 
cross-border deals (2nd stage regressions; tables available upon request). This implies that a firm’s 
engagement towards its employees (over and beyond a country’s labor regulations) is not likely to be 
a significant driver of management’s decision to engage in domestic or cross-border M&A deals, but 
it does affect the value creation in these deals. 
 
V. Conclusion 
Despite the plethora of studies on how cross-border takeovers differ from domestic ones, a possible 
explanation based on human capital and employee-engagement is largely under-explored. In this paper, 
we have provided novel evidence on how human capital at the firm-level matters in M&As by 
investigating the role of an acquiring firm’s engagement in employee welfare on the returns to 




We find that acquirers engaging in cross-border deals have on average more generous employment 
policies at the firm level, and their deals also earn higher announcement returns compared to domestic 
acquirers. Acquirers with a higher degree of employment quality (especially in terms of monetary 
compensation) earn substantially higher returns around domestic M&A announcements, but this 
effect is reversed in cross-border acquisitions. We attribute this reversal effect in cross-border deals 
to labor-related frictions. The underlying idea is that the acquiring firm cannot easily change the 
explicit and implicit contracts (such as compensation contracts and policies, or tacit agreements with 
labor unions) in the foreign target firm, so as to align acquirer’s and target’s employment policies and 
to properly incentivize employees in both firms and unleash their combined human capital. We do 
not find consistent evidence that (differences in) country-level labor regulations, economic 
development, and culture, geographical distance between target and acquirer, or their main languages 
drive our results. Furthermore, our main findings stem from the employee-engagement of the acquirer 
rather than of the target. 
Our study adds to the literature on the determinants of value creation in cross-border acquisitions. 
By acquiring a foreign target, firms can take advantage of cross-country differences in legal 
environment and investor protection (Rossi and Volpin (2004), Bris and Cabolis (2008)), product 
markets (DeGiovanni, 2005), financial development (Alquist et al., 2014), and tax rules (Huizinga and 
Voget, 2009). However, such differences also induce additional complexity and uncertainties (Aguilera 
and Dencker, 2004) arising from cultural and organizational differences that affect post-merger 
coordination and the realization of merger synergies (Siegel, Licht, and Schwartz (2012), Ahern et al. 
(2015)). This paper provides evidence for a new source of frictions arising in cross-border acquisitions, 
namely those related to the transfer and integration of employee policies across national borders. 
Our study is also related to the growing literature on human capital in M&As. While some recent 
studies look at labor relations in the context of corporate restructuring and takeovers (Atanassov and 
Kim, 2009; Masulis et al., 2016; John, Knyazeva, and Knyazava, 2015; Dessaint et al., 2016; Levine et 
al., 2015; Kim et al., 2015; Lin, Schmid, and Xuan, 2017; Ahmad and Lambert, 2016),, rather than at 




generally based on the US framework (Pagano and Volpin (2005), Cronqvist et al (2009), Edmans 
(2011, 2012), Edmans, Li, and Zhang 2015), Masulis et al (2016)). Instead, this paper is the first to 
provide global evidence on firm-level investment in employee relations and how labor-related frictions 
in cross-border M&A deals affect the link between employee-engagement and deal performance.  
Taken together, our findings may provide an explanation for the marked differences in deal 
performance between domestic and cross-border takeovers, as well as for the conflicting findings in 
the existing literature on the role of labor orientation in driving firm and shareholder value. Perhaps 
the most intuitive implication of our results is that firms and shareholders should not consider 
generous employee benefits as being absolutely good or bad for firm value in the context of an 
acquisition. A trade-off exists between value-enhancing incentive effects and the labor-related frictions 
brought about by cross-border deals. Overall, our findings reinforce the notion that employees play a 
fundamental yet nuanced role in a corporation, and highlight the importance of taking into account 
such nuances when studying M&As and the interplay between finance and labor, which remain a 
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Table 1. Descriptive Statistics - Acquirer 
This table shows summary statistics for the variables used in our study for domestic and cross-border deals. Panel A shows descriptive statistics for the acquiring firms’ labor orientation 
measure. Panel B shows a set of deal-level variables, including the acquirer’s announcement returns. Panel C shows firm-level variables and Panels D and E show country-level labor regulation 
indices for the acquirer’s and target’s country, respectively. Continuous variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. 
Variables N Mean Median St. Dev. Min. Max. N Mean Median St. Dev. Min. Max. Difference 
Domestic Deals Cross-Border Deals  
Panel A: Labor Orientation Variables (Acquirer)   
Workforce Diversity Score 2,550 49.81 45.61 31.40 4.830 98.67 2,015 56.66 57.80 30.94 6.11 98.79 -6.84*** 
Employment Quality Score 2,550 49.31 47.92 29.91 2.950 98.45 2,015 58.64 64.75 30.40 2.88 98.57 -9.34*** 
Health and Safety Score 2,550 45.50 38.62 29.60 2.800 99.44 2,015 58.09 58.22 30.27 3 99.49 -12.59*** 
Training and Development Score 2,550 47.97 45.29 31.25 5.160 97.40 2,015 61.66 72.34 29.49 5.16 97.39 -13.69*** 
Bonus Plan (Dummy)  2,550 0.386 0 0.486 0 1 2,015 0.478 0 0.499 0 1 -0.09*** 
Fringe Benefits (Dummy) 2,550 0.436 0 0.495 0 1 2,015 0.442 0 0.496 0 1 -0.006 
Wage Ratio Empl./CEO 2,550 0.337 0.315 1.552 0.001 11.25 2,015 0.369 0.001 1.631 0.001 10.96 -0.03 
Net Employment Creation 2,550 0.035 0 0.339 -0.79 8.06 2,015 0.023 0 0.599 -0.65 25.61 0.01 
Trade Union Relations Policy 2,550 0.176 0 0.381 0 1 2,015 0.316 0 0.465 0 1 -0.14*** 
Job Security Policy 2,550 0.060 0 0.238 0 1 2,015 0.110 0 0.313 0 1 -0.05*** 
Panel B: Deal-level Variables   
Acquirer CARs 2,550 -0.246 -0.219 4.275 -12.13 13.42 2,015 0.159 0.028 4.027 -12.13 13.42 -0.41*** 
Public Target 2,550 0.193 0 0.395 0 1 2,015 0.147 0 0.354 0 1 0.07*** 
Diversifying Deal 2,550 0.485 0 0.500 0 1 2,015 0.398 0 0.490 0 1 0.09 
Hostile Deal 2,550 0.009 0 0.0946 0 1 2,015 0.012 0 0.111 0 1 -0.003 
All-Cash Financing Deal 2,550 0.411 0 0.492 0 1 2,015 0.369 0 0.483 0 1 0.04*** 
Multiple Bidders 2,550 0.033 0 0.177 0 1 2,015 0.041 0 0.199 0 1 -0.01 
Toehold Stake 2,550 0.154 0 0.361 0 1 2,015 0.106 0 0.308 0 1 0.05*** 
Relative Deal Size 2,550 0.169 0.032 0.007 0 3.28 2,015 0.159 0.021 0.604 0 20.07 0.01 
Panel C: Firm-level Variables    
Acquirer Leverage 2,550 0.443 0.406 0.257 -0.005 1.000 2,015 0.429 0.388 0.253 0.001 1.000 0.01* 
Acquirer ROA 2,550 0.110 0.0986 0.105 -0.972 2.209 2,015 0.127 0.118 0.093 -0.60 0.645 -0.02*** 
Serial Acquirer 2,550 0.217 0 0.412 0 1 2,015 0.300 0 0.458 0 1 -0.08*** 
Acquirer Size (USD Mil) 2,550 38,906 6,925 123,507 249.9 1,107,776 2,015 65,855 8,733 186,560 249.9 1,107,776 -35,010*** 
Panel D: Country-level Variables (Acquirer)   
Employment Laws Index 2,550 0.318 0.218 0.180 0.161 0.828 2,015 0.411 0.282 0.216 0.161 0.828 -0.09*** 
Collective Relations Laws Index 2,550 0.382 0.259 0.174 0.188 0.711 2,015 0.410 0.384 0.178 0.188 0.711 -0.03*** 
Social Security Laws Index 2,550 0.678 0.646 0.0868 0.177 0.873 2,015 0.702 0.692 0.092 0.177 0.873 -0.02*** 
Civil Rights Index 2,550 0.685 0.733 0.0997 0.233 0.850 2,015 0.660 0.733 0.119 0.233 0.850 0.02*** 
Panel E: Country-level Variables (Target) – Cross-Border Only    
Employment Laws Index       2,015 0.437 0.403 0.201 0.148 0.828  
Collective Relations Laws Index       2,015 0.400 0.378 0.155 0.188 0.711  
Social Security Laws Index       2,015 0.679 0.692 0.135 0.105 0.873  






Table 2. Descriptive Statistics – Target 
 
This table shows summary statistics for the variables used in our study for domestic and cross-border deals. Panel A shows descriptive statistics for the target firms’ labor orientation 
measure. Panel B shows a set of deal-level variables, including the target’s announcement returns. Panel C shows firm-level variables and Panel D shows country-level labor regulation 
indices target’s country. Continuous variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. 
 
Variables N Mean Median St. Dev. Min. Max. N Mean Median St. Dev. Min. Max. Difference 
Domestic Deals Cross-Border Deals  
Panel A: Labor Orientation Variables (Acquirer)   
Workforce Diversity Score 202 52.98 50.00 30.17 8.260 97.35 160 58.63 58.43 28.12 10.21 97.94 -5.65* 
Employment Quality Score 202 54.42 59.34 29.83 3.520 97.78 160 62.36 70.76 28.79 3.330 97.81 -7.94** 
Health and Safety Score 202 48.89 44.13 28.87 10.23 98.99 160 59.65 59.77 28.60 10.57 98.84 -10.75*** 
Training and Development Score 202 55.01 63.28 30.98 5.200 96.58 160 60.28 73.57 30.45 5.190 96.45 -5.27 
Panel B: Deal-level Variables   
Target CARs 202 6.307 3.185 12.02 -41.00 53.12 160 7.386 2.491 12.54 -12.48 55.21 -1.08 
Weighted CARs 202 1.321 0.524 4.014 -5.140 12.15 160 1.166 0.541 3.729 -5.140 12.15 0.15 
Panel C: Firm-level Variables    
Target  ROA 202 0.301 0.0998 1.533 -6.680 10.63 160 0.299 0.110 1.426 -2.540 12.23 0.002 
Relative Deal Size 202 0.699 0.553 0.604 0.00237 3.278 160 0.461 0.301 0.604 0.001 4.930 0.24*** 
Target Size (USD Mil) 202 29,567 6,985 60,273 48.10 289,603 160 25,006 5,661 57,277 89.30 289,603 4,561 
Panel D: Country-level Variables (Target)    
Employment Laws Index 202 0.324 0.218 0.182 0.164 0.809 160 0.394 0.282 0.200 0.164 0.828 -0.07*** 
Collective Relations Laws Index 202 0.343 0.259 0.161 0.188 0.667 160 0.349 0.259 0.159 0.188 0.667 -0.006 
Social Security Laws Index 202 0.678 0.646 0.0677 0.400 0.873 160 0.704 0.692 0.0741 0.400 0.873 -0.03*** 






Table 3. Employee Quality and Announcement CARs 
 
This table shows regression results where the dependent variable is the acquirer’s three-day CAR around an M&A 
announcement for subsamples of domestic and cross-border deals (Panel A), or for the combined sample (Panel B). The 
main independent variable is the acquirer’s pre-merger employee quality score in terms of job security and monetary benefits 
(0-100), interacted with a cross-border deal dummy in Panel B. All specifications include a set of deal- (dummies for serial 
acquirers, toeholds, multiple bidders, all-cash financed deals, hostile deals, diversifying deals, and public targets, and the 
relative deal size), firm- (acquirer ROA, size, and leverage), and acquirer and target country-level (labor protection indices 
as in Botero et al. (2004)) control variables or acquirer and target country fixed effects. In addition, each specification 
includes year, acquirer industry, target industry fixed effects, along with acquirer country by target country fixed effects 
(Panel A, Model 5), acquirer region by target region fixed effects (Panel A, Model 6, and Panel B, Model 4), or acquirer firm 
fixed effects (Panel B, Models 5 and 6). Model 5 in Panel B includes the full sample of acquirers; Model 6 in Panel B only 
includes acquirers that engage in both domestic and cross-border deals. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. 
*, ** and *** stand for statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
 
Panel A: Subsamples Domestic Cross-Border 
Dep.Var.: Acquirer CAR [-1,+1] (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Acquirer Employment Qualityt-1 0.008** 0.007** -0.009** -0.010*** -0.009* -0.008** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) 
Observations 2,550 2,550 2,015 2,015 2,015 2,015 
Adj. R-squared 0.075 0.086 0.058 0.110 0.103 0.314 
Firm and Deal Level Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Acquirer and Target Country Level Controls Yes No Yes No No No 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Acquirer and Target Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Acquirer and Target Country FE No Yes No Yes No No 
Acquirer Region x Target Region FE No No No No Yes No 
Acquirer Country x Target Country FE No No No No No Yes 
Panel B: Full Sample       
Dep.Var.: Acquirer CAR [-1,+1] (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Acquirer Employment Qualityt-1 
0.007** 0.005* 0.007** 0.007** 0.012** 0.001 
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.005) (0.006) 
Acquirer Employment Qualityt-1 × Cross-
Border 
-0.013*** -0.013*** -0.014*** -0.015*** -0.014** -0.014** 
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.006) (0.007) 
Cross-Border 
1.178*** 1.231*** 1.184*** 1.158*** 1.129** 1.083** 
(0.294) (0.312) (0.303) (0.278) (0.446) (0.472) 
Observations 4,565 4,565 4,565 4,565 4,565 2,363 
Adj. R-squared 0.037 0.042 0.027 0.050 0.054 0.078 
Firm and Deal Level Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Acquirer and Target Country Level Controls Yes No No No No No 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Acquirer and Target Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes No No 
Acquirer Country FE No Yes Yes Yes No No 
Target Country FE No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Acquirer and Target Region FE No No Yes No No No 
Acquirer Region x Target Region FE No No No Yes No No 




Table 4. Unbundling Employee Incentives  
 
This table shows regression results where the dependent variable is the acquirer’s three-day CAR around domestic and 
cross-border deal announcements. The main independent variables are the acquirer’s pre-merger employee quality 
dimensions in terms of monetary incentives (Panel A), and job security factors (Panel B), interacted with a cross-border 
deal dummy. Monetary incentives consist of a bonus plan (Model 1a), fringe benefits (Model 2a), and the wage ratio of 
an average worker and the CEO (Model 3a). Job security factors consist of an indicator for having a trade union relations 
policy in place (Model 1b), net employment creation, measured as employment growth in the previous year (Model 2b), 
and a dummy for whether the firm has a job security policy (Model 3b). Each specification includes a set of deal- (relative 
deal size, and dummies for serial acquirers, toeholds, multiple bidders, all-cash financed deals, hostile deals, diversifying 
deals, and public targets), firm- (acquirer ROA, size,  and leverage), and country-level (acquirer country labor protection 
indices as in Botero et al. (2004)) control variables. Each specification includes year, acquirer industry, target industry, 
and acquirer by target region fixed effects fixed effects. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. *, ** and *** 
stand for statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
Dependent Variable: Acquirer CAR [-1,+1] 
Panel A: Monetary Incentives 
(1a) (2a) (3a) 
Cross-Border 0.628*** 0.662*** 0.315* 
 (0.255) (0.235) (0.193) 
Acquirer Bonus Plan Dummy t-1 0.389***   
 (0.148)   
Acquirer Bonus Plan Dummy t-1 × Cross-Border -0.591***   
 (0.227)   
Acquirer Fringe Benefits Dummy t-1  0.470*** 
 
  (0.163) 
 
Acquirer Fringe Benefits Dummy t-1 × Cross-Border  -0.673***  
  (0.232)  






Acquirer Wage Ratio Employees/CEO t-1 × Cross-Border   -0.109*** 
   (0.041) 
Observations 4,565 4,565 4,565 
Adj. R-squared 0.068 0.068 0.057 
Deal-, Firm-, and Country-Level Controls Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes 
Acquirer and Target Industry FE Yes Yes Yes 
Acquirer Region x Target Region FE Yes Yes Yes 
Dependent Variable: Acquirer CAR [-1,+1] 
Panel B: Job Security Factors 
(1b) (2b) (3b) 
Cross-Border 0.303 0.341* 0.388* 
 (0.201) (0.201) (0.210) 




Acquirer Trade Union Relations Policy t-1 × Cross-Border 0.194   
 (0.273)   








Acquirer Net Employment Creation t-1 × Cross-Border  0.051  
  (0.154)  






Acquirer Job Security Policy t-1 × Cross-Border   -0.385 
  (0.432) 
Observations 4,565 4,565 4,565 
Adj. R-squared 0.067 0.067 0.067 
Deal-, Firm-, and Country-Level Controls Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes 
Acquirer and Target Industry FE Yes Yes Yes 






Table 5. Acquirer Employment Quality: Channels (Cross-Border Deals) 
 
This table shows regression results where the dependent variable is the acquirer’s three-day CAR around cross-border deal 
announcements. The main independent variables are a dummy for whether the acquirer does a repeat acquisition in a particular 
country (Model 1), a dummy indicating whether the target country’s population considers “good pay” more important in a job than 
the acquirer’s country (Model 2), a dummy indicating whether the target country’s population considers “saving money” a more 
important child quality than the acquirer’s country (Model 3), a dummy indicating whether the target country has a main executive 
party that is not considered “nationalist”(Model 4), a dummy indicating whether the target’s and the acquirer’s country’s population 
have low confidence in unions (union strength) (Model 5), or a dummy indicating low-tech deals (both the acquirer and target are 
in low-tech industries) (Model 6), all interacted with employment quality. Each specification includes a set of deal- (dummies for 
serial acquirers, toeholds, multiple bidders, all-cash financed deals, hostile deals, and public targets), firm- (acquirer ROA, size, and 
leverage), and country-level (acquirer and target country labor protection indices as in Botero et al. (2004)) control variables.  Each 
specification includes year, acquirer industry, target industry, and acquirer by target region fixed effects fixed effects.  Robust 
standard errors are reported in parentheses. *, ** and *** stand for statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
 



















Acquirer Employment Quality t-1 
-0.011*** -0.010*** -0.027*** -0.039** -0.010*** -0.016*** 
(0.003) (0.003) (0.009) (0.017) (0.003) (0.005) 
Acquirer Employment Quality t-1 × 
Repeat Acquisition 
0.017**      
(0.006)      
Acquirer Employment Quality t-1 × 
(Target Country > Acq. Country “Good 
Pay is Important”) 





Acquirer Employment Quality t-1 × 
(Target Country > Acq. Country “Saving 
Money is Important”) 





Acquirer Employment Quality t-1 × 
(Absence of Economic Nationalism in 
Target Country) 





Acquirer Employment Quality t-1 × 
(Acquirer and Target Country Low Union 
Strength) 





Acquirer Employment Quality t-1 × Low-
Tech Deal 
     0.012** 
     (0.006) 
Repeat Acquisition 
-0.678      
(0.552)      
Target Country > Acq. Country “Good 
Pay is Important” 
 -2.926***     
 (0.944)     
Target Country > Acq. Country “Saving 
Money is Important” 
  -0.121    
  (0.739)    
Absence of Economic Nationalism in 
Target Country 
   -0.837   
   (0.766)   
Acquirer and Target Country Low Union 
Strength 
    -1.277**  
    (0.608)  
Low-Tech Deal 
     -0.683* 
     (0.349) 
Observations 2,015 2,015 2,015 2,015 2,015 2,015 
Adj. R-squared 0.104 0.098 0.098 0.102 0.106 0.102 
Deal-, Firm-, and Country-Level Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Acquirer and Target Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Acquirer Region by Target Region FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 





Table 6. Long-Run Operating Performance 
 
This table shows regression results where the dependent variables are the acquirer’s average 2-year post-merger industry-adjusted 
ROA (defined as net income/assets) (Model 1), the acquirer’s 2-year post-merger industry-adjusted ROS (return on sales) (Model 2), 
or the acquirer’s Sales-to-Employees ratio (Model 3) following domestic and cross-border deal announcements. The independent 
variables are the acquirer’s pre-merger employment quality score and the acquirer’s pre-merger industry-adjusted ROA (Model 1), 
ROS (Model 2), or the combined industry-adjusted Sales-to-Employees ratio (Model 3). Each specification includes a set of deal- 
(relative deal size, dummies for serial acquirers, toeholds, multiple bidders, all-cash financed deals, hostile deals, diversifying deals, 
and public targets), firm- (acquirer ROA and leverage), and country-level (index for acquirer and target country labor regulations as 
in Botero et al. (2004)) control variables. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. *, ** and *** stand for statistical 
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
 
 
Dependent variable:  
(1) 
2-Year Post-Merger 
Acquirer ROA  
(2) 
2-Year Post-Merger 




Acquirer Employment Quality  
0.014* 0.002 0.012 
(0.008) (0.001) (0.010) 
Cross-Border 
1.736** 0.385 1.150* 
(0.796) (0.270) (0.666) 
Acquirer Employment Quality x Cross-Border 
-0.024** -0.004* -0.020** 
(0.012) (0.002) (0.009) 
Pre-Merger Acquirer ROA (industry-adjusted) 
0.069***   
(0.025)   
Pre-Merger Acquirer ROS (industry-adjusted) 
 0.526**  
 (0.259)  
Pre-Merger Combined Sales/Employees Ratio (industry-
adjusted) 
  1.224*** 
  (0.200) 
Deal-, Firm-, and Country-Level Controls Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1,113 2,478 85 








Table 7. Aligning the Target’s Employee-Engagement with Acquirer’s Employee-Engagement 
 
This table shows regression results where the dependent variable is the acquirer’s three-day CAR around an M&A 
announcement. The independent variables are dummies for combinations of above- and below-median target and 
acquirer employee relations in terms of employment quality. All specifications include a set of deal- (dummies for 
serial acquirers, toeholds, multiple bidders, all-cash financed deals, hostile deals, diversifying deals, and relative deal 
size), firm- (acquirer ROA, size, and leverage, and target ROA), and acquirer and target country-level (labor 
protection indices as in Botero et al. (2004)) control variables. Each specification includes year, acquirer industry, 
and target industry fixed effects.  
 
Dependent Variable: Acquirer CAR [-1,+1] (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Cross-Border -1.369* -0.544 -0.126 1.041  
(0.793) (0.495) (0.615) (1.006) 
Low Acq. Employment Quality, High Target 
Employment Quality 
-1.377   -0.474 
(0.846)   (0.788) 
Low Acq. Employment Quality, High Target 
Employment Quality × Cross-Border 
1.876   -0.472 
(1.437)   (1.584) 
High Acq. Employment Quality, Low Target 
Employment Quality 
 0.198  0.667 
 (0.703)  (0.744) 
High Acq. Employment Quality, Low Target 
Employment Quality × Cross-Border 
 -1.651*  -3.205*** 
 (0.925)  (1.043) 
High Acq. Employment Quality, High Target 
Employment Quality 
  2.318** 2.286* 
  (1.062) (1.203) 
High Acq. Employment Quality, High Target 
Employment Quality × Cross-Border 
  -2.691** -3.982*** 
  (1.065) (1.278) 
Observations 362 362 362 362 
Adj. R-squared 0.161 0.159 0.171 0.186 
Deal, Firm, and Country Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 





Table 8. Dimensions of Employee-Engagement, Placebo Tests 
 
This table shows regression results where the dependent variable is the acquirer’s three-day CAR around an M&A announcement. The 
independent variables are the acquirer’s pre-merger employee relations scores in terms of (a combination of (Model (5)) employment quality 
(Model (1)), health and safety (Model (2)), workforce diversity (Model (3)), and training and development (Model (4)). All specifications include 
a set of deal- (dummies for serial acquirers, toeholds, multiple bidders, all-cash financed deals, hostile deals, diversifying deals, and public targets, 
and the relative deal size), firm- (acquirer ROA, size, and leverage), and acquirer and target country-level (labor protection indices as in Botero 
et al. (2004)) control variables. Each specification includes year, acquirer industry, target industry, and acquirer by target region fixed effects 




Dependent Variable: Acquirer CAR [-1,+1] (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Cross-Border 1.158*** 0.587* 0.658* 0.537 1.086***  
(0.278) (0.321) (0.360) (0.388) (0.401) 
Acquirer Employment Qualityt-1 0.007**    0.008* 
 (0.003)    (0.004) 
Acquirer Employment Qualityt-1 × Cross-Border -0.015***    -0.017***  
(0.004)    (0.006) 
Acquirer Health & Safetyt-1  0.001   -0.002 
  (0.002)   (0.003) 
Acquirer Health & Safetyt-1× Cross-Border  -0.001   -0.001  
 (0.004)   (0.004) 
Acquirer Workforce Diversity-1   0.004  0.004 
   (0.003)  (0.004) 
Acquirer Workforce Diversity-1× Cross-Border   -0.006  -0.003  
  (0.005)  (0.005) 
Acquirer Training & Developmentt-1    0.0004 -0.005 
    (0.003) (0.004) 
Acquirer Training & Developmentt-1× Cross-Border    -0.004 0.007  
   (0.005) (0.005) 
Observations 4,565 4,565 4,565 4,565 4,565 
Adj. R-squared 0.050 0.048 0.048 0.048 0.051 
Acquirer and Target Country Level Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Acquirer and Target Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 






Table 9. Difference of Labor Regulations between Acquirer and Target Countries in Cross-Border Deals 
 
This table shows regression results where the dependent variable is the acquirer’s three-day CAR around cross-border deal 
announcements. The independent variables in are the acquirer’s pre-merger employee relations in terms of employment quality, and 
the difference between the acquirer and target country’s employment laws index (model 1), collective relations laws index (model 2), 
social security laws index (model 3), civil rights index (model 4), and their interactions with employment quality.  Each specification 
includes a set of deal- (relative deal size, dummies for serial acquirers, toeholds, multiple bidders, all-cash financed deals, hostile 
deals, diversifying deals, and public targets), firm- (acquirer ROA and leverage), and country-level (acquirer country labor protection 
indices as in Botero et al. (2004)) control variables.  Each specification includes year, acquirer industry, target industry, and acquirer 
by target region fixed effects fixed effects. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. *, ** and *** stand for statistical 
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
 
 
Dependent Variable: Acquirer CAR [-1,+1] (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Acquirer Employment Quality 
-0.010** -0.010** -0.010*** -0.010*** -0.011*** 
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Difference Acquirer-Target Employment Laws 
Indices 
-0.494 
   
-0.818 
(1.084) 
   
(1.201) 
Acquirer Employment Quality × Difference 
Acquirer-Target Employment Laws Indices 
0.007 
   
0.011 
(0.013) 
   
(0.016) 








Acquirer Employment Quality × Difference 


















Acquirer Employment Quality × Difference 

















Acquirer Employment Quality × Difference 








     
Observations 2,015 2,015 2,015 2,015 2,015 
Adj. R-squared 0.131 0.131 0.132 0.131 0.132 
Deal and Firm Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Acquirer and Target Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 




Table 10. Testing Alternative Explanations for the Attenuating Effect in Cross-Border Deals 
 
This table shows regression results where the dependent variable is the acquirer’s three-day CAR around cross-border (Models 1-6) 
or cross-border and domestic (Model 7) deal announcements. The main independent variables are a dummy for whether the distance 
between the target’s and acquirer’s country is higher than the sample median (Model 1), whether the target’s and acquirer’s countries 
have a common language (Model 2) or a border (Model 3), the difference in log(GDP/Capita) between the target’s and acquirer’s 
country (Model 4), the difference in the percentage of the target’s and acquirer’s country’s population that considers “responsibility” 
important (Model 5), a dummy indicating whether the target’s country’s population considers “job security” more important in a 
job than the acquirer’s country’s population (Model 6), all interacted with employment quality. Model 7 reports the result of 
regressing acquirer CAR on a dummy variable indicating that the acquirer has high employment quality (defined as the Employment 
Quality score above 50) and without any interaction on the subsample of domestic deals only. Each specification includes a set of 
deal- (dummies for serial acquirers, toeholds, multiple bidders, all-cash financed deals, hostile deals, relative deal size, and public 
targets), firm- (acquirer ROA, size, and leverage), and country-level (acquirer and target country labor protection indices as in Botero 
et al. (2004)) control variables.  Each specification includes year, acquirer industry, target industry, and acquirer by target region 
fixed effects fixed effects. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. *, ** and *** stand for statistical significance at the 
10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
 
Dependent Variable: Acquirer CAR [-1,+1] 
 














Acquirer Employment Quality t-1 
-0.008 -0.011*** -0.009*** -0.010*** -0.012** -0.009***  
(0.005) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.006) (0.003)  
Distance > Median 
-0.482       
(0.611)       
Acquirer Employment Quality t-1 
 × (Distance > Median) 
-0.001       
(0.007)       
Target and Acquirer Country Share 
Common Language 
 -0.232      
 (0.633)      
Acquirer Employment Quality t-1 
 × (Target and Acquirer Country Share 
Common Language) 
 0.007      
 (0.008)      
Target and Acquirer Country Share Border 
  0.767     
  (0.782)     
Acquirer Employment Quality t-1 
 × (Target and Acquirer Country Share 
Border) 
  0.004     
  (0.009)     
Difference in log(GDP/Capita) 
   0.232    
   (0.258)    
Acquirer Employment Quality t-1 
 × (Difference in log(GDP/Capita)) 
   -0.002    
   (0.003)    
Target > Acquirer Country “Responsibility 
is Important” 
    -0.034*   
    (0.019)   
Acquirer Employment Quality t-1 
 × (Target > Acquirer Country 
“Responsibility is Important”) 
    0.001   
    (0.002)   
Target > Acquirer Country “Job Security is 
Important” 
     -0.806  
     (1.029)  
Acquirer Employment Quality t-1 
 × (Target > Acquirer Country “Job Security 
is Important”) 
     0.009  
     (0.013)  
Acquirer High Employment Quality 
(Dummy) 
      0.368** 
      (0.187) 
Observations 2,015 2,015 2,015 1,735 1,432 2,015 2,550 
Adj. R-squared 0.100 0.105 0.108 0.110 0.131 0.105 0.042 
Deal-, Firm-, and Country-Level Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Acquirer and Target Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Acquirer Region x Target Region FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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Appendix A. Variable Descriptions 
Deal Characteristics 
Cross-Border 
A dummy equal to one if the deal is labelled as “Cross-Border” in SDC, and zero otherwise. 
Source: SDC Mergers and Acquisitions Database. 
Public Target 
A dummy equal to one if the target’s public status is “Listed”, and zero otherwise. Source: SDC 
Mergers and Acquisitions Database. 
Diversifying Deal 
A dummy equal to one if the acquirer’s 2-digit SIC code is different from the target’s 2-digit SIC 
code, and zero otherwise. Source: SDC Mergers and Acquisitions Database. 
Hostile Deal 
A dummy equal to one if the deal’s attitude is labelled as “Hostile” in SDC, and zero otherwise. 
Source: SDC Mergers and Acquisitions Database. 
All-Cash Financing 
A dummy equal to one if the deal is fully financed in cash, and zero otherwise. Source: SDC 
Mergers and Acquisitions Database. 
Multiple Bidders 
A dummy equal to one if more than one bidding firm was involved in the deal, and zero 
otherwise. Source: SDC Mergers and Acquisitions Database. 
Firm Characteristics 
Toehold 
A dummy equal to one if the acquiring firm had a toehold before the acquisition, and zero 
otherwise. Source: SDC Mergers and Acquisitions Database. 
Relative Deal Size 
Value of the deal, divided by the market value of equity of the acquiring firm. Source: SDC 
Mergers and Acquisitions Database. 
Acquirer Size Log of the acquirer’s total assets. Source: Datastream. 
Acquirer Leverage 
Book value of the acquirer’s total liabilities, divided by the market value of assets. Source: 
Datastream. 
Acquirer ROA Acquirer’s EBITDA, divided by the book value of assets. Source: Datastream. 
Serial Acquirer 
A dummy equal to one if the acquiring firm made more than 10 takeover announcements over 
the sample period, and zero otherwise. 
Country Labor Regulations 
Employment Laws 
Index 
Measures the protection of labor and employment laws, calculated as the average of (i) 
alternative employment contracts; (ii) cost of increasing hours worked; (iii) cost of firing 
workers; and (iv) dismissal procedures. Source: Botero et al. (2004). 
Collective Relations 
Laws Index 
Measures the protection of collective relations laws, calculated as the average of (i) labor union 
power and (ii) collective disputes. Source: Botero et al. (2004). 
Social Security Laws 
Index 
Measures social security benefits, based on measures of (i) old age, disability and death benefits; 
(ii) sickness and health benefits; and (iii) unemployment benefits. Source: Botero et al. (2004). 
Civil Rights Index 
Measures the degree of protection of vulnerable groups against employment discrimination, 
based on measures of (i) labor discrimination on grounds of race is expressly prohibited by law, 
(ii) labor discrimination on grounds of gender is expressly prohibited by law, (iii) statutory 
duration of maternity leave with retention of 100% of earnings, (iv) minimum working age, and 





A score measuring the firm’s commitment and effectiveness towards providing high-quality 
employment benefits and job conditions, such as distributing fair employment benefits, focusing 
on long-term employment growth and stability, avoiding lay-offs, and maintaining relations with 
trade unions. The score ranges from 0 to 100, with larger value indicating better employment 
relations. Source: Thomson Reuters ASSET4 ESG Database. 
Health and Safety 
A score measuring the firm’s commitment and effectiveness towards providing a healthy and 
safe workplace, concern for physical and mental health, well-being, and stress levels of all 
employees. The score ranges from 0 to 100, with larger value indicating better employment 
relations. Source: Thomson Reuters ASSET4 ESG Database. 
Workforce Diversity 
A score measuring the firm’s commitment and effectiveness towards maintaining diversity and 
equal opportunities in its workforce, such as promoting an effective work-life balance, a family-
friendly environment, and equal opportunities regardless of age, gender, ethnicity, religion, or 
sexual orientation. The score ranges from 0 to 100, with larger values indicating better 
employment relations. Source: Thomson Reuters ASSET4 ESG Database. 
Training and 
Development 
A score measuring the firm’s commitment and effectiveness towards providing training and 
development (education) for its workforce. The score ranges from 0 to 100, with larger values 
indicating better employee relations. Source: Thomson Reuters ASSET4 ESG Database. 
Bonus Plan Dummy 
A dummy indicator for whether the firm provides a bonus plan to at least the middle 
management level whether employees' compensation based on personal or company-wide 
targets. Source: Thomson Reuters ASSET4 ESG Database. 
Fringe Benefits 
Dummy 
A dummy indicator for whether the firm provides its employees with a pension fund, health 
care, or other insurances. Source: Thomson Reuters ASSET4 ESG Database. 
Wage Ratio 
Employees/CEO 
Ratio between an average worker’s salary and the CEO’s salary, measured as Average Salaries 
and Benefits/Highest Salary. Source: Thomson Reuters ASSET4 ESG Database. 
Net Employment 
Creation 
Growth in the firms’ employee base, measured as Number of Employees, scaled by last year’s 
Number of Employees, -1. Source: Thomson Reuters ASSET4 ESG Database. 
Trade Union 
Relations Policy 
A dummy indicator for whether the firm has a policy in place to ensure good relations with 
trade unions. Source: Thomson Reuters ASSET4 ESG Database. 
Job Security Policy 
A dummy indicator whether the firm has a policy in place to maintain job security. Source: 
Thomson Reuters ASSET4 ESG Database. 
Mechanisms 
Repeat Acquisition 
A dummy equal to one if the firm has acquired a firm in the target’s country in the past. It is 
equal to zero if the firm has not previously acquired any firms in the target’s country.  
Target Country > Acq. 
Country “Good Pay is 
Important” 
A dummy equal to one if the target’s country is in the top tercile and the acquirer’s country is in 
the bottom tercile for the variable “importance of good pay in a job”, aggregated at the country 
level. Source: World Value Survey. 
Target Country > Acq. 
Country “Saving 
Money is Important” 
A dummy equal to one if the target’s country is in the top tercile and the acquirer’s country is in 
the bottom tercile for the variable “saving money is an important child quality”, aggregated at 






Absence of Economic 
Nationalism in Target 
Country 
A dummy equal to one if the target country’s government has a rightwing/liberal main executive 
party. It is equal to zero if it has a leftwing/nationalist main executive party. Source: Database of 
Political Institutions.  
Acquirer and Target 
Country Low Union 
Strength 
A dummy equal to one if the target’s and acquirer’s country are in the bottom tercile for the 
variable “confidence in unions”, aggregated at the country level. Source: World Value Survey. 
Ind-Yr Average 
Salaries & Benefits 
Expenses 
Firms’ annual expenses in terms of employee salaries and benefits, averaged annually by 
industry. Source: Worldscope. 
Distance > Median 
A dummy equal to one if the log distance between the acquirer’s and target’s capitals is above 
the sample median, and zero otherwise. Source: CEPII. 
Target and Acquirer 
Countries Share 
Common Language 
A dummy equal to one if the acquirer’s and target’s country have an official language in 
common, and zero otherwise. Source: CEPII. 
Target and Acquirer 
Countries Share 
Common Border 
A dummy equal to one if the acquirer’s and target’s countries share a common border, and zero 
otherwise. Source: CEPII. 
Low-Tech Deal 




The difference in log(GDP/Capita) between the acquirer’s and target’s countries. Source: CEPII. 




A dummy equal to one if the target’s country is in the top tercile and the acquirer’s country is in 
the bottom tercile for the variable “a feeling of responsibility is important”, aggregated at the 
country level. Source: World Value Survey. 
Target Country > Acq. 
Country “Job Security 
is Important” 
A dummy equal to one if the target’s country is in the top tercile and the acquirer’s country is in 
the bottom tercile for the variable “job security is important in a job”, aggregated at the country 




Appendix B. Industry Distribution  
This table shows the sample distribution by acquirer industry and year for the domestic and cross-border deals in our sample. 
 Year  
Acquirer Industry (Fama-French 48) 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 Total 
Agriculture 0 0 2 1 3 0 3 4 6 7 2 0 28 
Food Products 2 0 3 7 6 7 5 16 16 16 11 6 95 
Candy & Soda 0 1 0 5 4 0 1 2 5 3 4 0 25 
Beer & Liquor 6 5 6 3 3 4 2 1 5 11 1 2 49 
Tobacco Products 1 1 0 0 3 1 4 0 1 1 0 1 13 
Recreation 2 1 2 3 7 7 6 0 2 2 4 0 36 
Entertainment 1 0 0 3 1 2 1 1 1 3 1 0 14 
Printing and Publishing 3 4 4 11 6 3 2 9 8 5 6 2 63 
Consumer Goods 0 1 4 3 4 5 2 16 9 13 6 4 67 
Apparel 0 2 3 1 2 1 1 1 1 2 0 0 14 
Healthcare 1 0 3 2 5 1 0 4 1 3 3 2 25 
Medical Equipment 9 4 11 13 8 12 8 10 11 13 12 5 116 
Pharmaceutical Products 6 4 8 19 18 15 21 20 22 14 16 8 171 
Chemicals 3 6 7 13 9 12 6 17 16 21 17 6 133 
Rubber and Plastic Products 0 0 0 0 1 0 2 2 3 2 1 2 13 
Textiles 0 0 2 0 1 1 1 2 2 1 2 0 12 
Construction Material 5 3 6 9 8 8 6 8 7 10 5 3 78 
Construction 3 2 7 9 19 5 12 9 8 5 11 4 94 
Steel Works Etc 4 2 9 8 9 10 11 15 14 8 4 8 102 
Fabricated Products 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 2 0 0 0 0 6 
Machinery 4 1 8 15 15 9 15 13 23 21 9 8 141 
Electrical Equipment 2 2 3 1 2 3 2 2 7 3 7 1 35 
Automobiles and Truck 1 3 2 4 8 7 3 3 7 3 5 3 49 
Aircraft 3 4 0 2 4 4 3 4 5 2 5 1 37 
Shipbuilding, Railroad Equipment 0 0 0 1 0 0 4 1 0 1 1 1 9 
Defense 2 0 1 1 2 5 1 2 0 0 1 2 17 
Precious Metals 0 0 3 3 2 6 25 18 22 16 10 2 107 
Non-Metallic and Industrial Metal Mining 0 0 4 5 8 11 15 17 19 15 7 4 105 
Coal 0 0 1 2 5 3 2 6 1 4 1 0 25 
Petroleum and Natural Gas 5 2 15 20 25 23 36 30 31 32 17 10 246 
Utilities 13 7 9 20 11 21 19 20 14 14 4 3 155 
Communication 8 6 28 24 18 18 30 19 24 18 23 13 229 
Personal Services 0 0 3 4 2 0 4 2 3 2 4 1 25 
Business Services 24 21 41 42 38 49 29 35 47 53 43 37 459 
Computers 1 5 6 6 11 5 11 11 11 14 12 2 95 
Electronic Equipment 11 10 13 23 22 13 19 17 13 23 11 11 186 
Measuring and Control Equipment 1 2 7 8 9 3 2 3 3 6 1 3 48 
Business Supplies 2 1 2 2 1 2 3 3 3 5 2 3 29 
Shipping Containers 3 2 1 3 3 0 1 0 2 3 1 1 20 
Transportation 4 4 12 12 8 13 10 15 5 8 9 4 104 
Wholesale 8 3 9 17 14 10 13 11 17 12 13 6 133 
Retail 1 1 4 19 15 22 14 15 27 22 18 14 172 
Restaurants, Hotels, Motels 2 5 6 6 3 4 2 0 7 2 3 3 43 
Banking 12 19 36 44 49 29 24 31 38 30 21 18 351 
Insurance 5 5 5 11 20 15 9 12 9 12 12 11 126 
Real Estate 1 4 4 3 5 4 4 4 8 3 4 5 49 
Trading 7 10 42 43 51 28 28 41 35 42 32 18 377 
Other 2 1 2 5 2 12 2 2 1 8 2 0 39 





Appendix C: Sample Distribution by Acquirer Country 
 
This table shows the sample distribution by acquirer country for the 
domestic and cross-border deals in our sample. 
Acquirer Nation Freq. Percent Cumulative Percent 
Argentina 3 0.07 0.07 
Australia 172 3.77 3.83 
Austria 27 0.59 4.42 
Belgium 35 0.77 5.19 
Brazil 84 1.84 7.03 
Canada 289 6.33 13.36 
Chile 9 0.2 13.56 
China 61 1.34 14.9 
Colombia 10 0.22 15.12 
Czech Republic 1 0.02 15.14 
Denmark 26 0.57 15.71 
Finland 44 0.96 16.67 
France 237 5.19 21.86 
Germany 54 1.18 23.04 
Greece 26 0.57 23.61 
Hong Kong 16 0.35 23.96 
Hungary 4 0.09 24.05 
India 31 0.68 24.73 
Indonesia 10 0.22 24.95 
Ireland-Rep 28 0.61 25.56 
Israel 3 0.07 25.63 
Italy 116 2.54 28.17 
Japan 672 14.72 42.89 
Malaysia 21 0.46 43.35 
Mexico 17 0.37 43.72 
Morocco 1 0.02 43.75 
Netherlands 58 1.27 45.02 
New Zealand 3 0.07 45.08 
Nigeria 1 0.02 45.1 
Norway 54 1.18 46.29 
Peru 2 0.04 46.33 
Philippines 11 0.24 46.57 
Poland 26 0.57 47.14 
Portugal 16 0.35 47.49 
Russian Fed 51 1.12 48.61 
Singapore 37 0.81 49.42 
South Africa 49 1.07 50.49 
South Korea 86 1.88 52.38 
Spain 114 2.5 54.87 
Sweden 81 1.77 56.65 
Switzerland 112 2.45 59.1 
Taiwan 35 0.77 59.87 
Thailand 13 0.28 60.15 
Turkey 7 0.15 60.31 
Ukraine 6 0.13 60.44 
United Kingdom 593 12.99 73.43 
United States 1,213 26.57 100 





Appendix D1: Employment Engagement by Acquirer Country 
 
Acquirer Country Employment Quality Training & Development Workforce Diversity Health & Safety 
Argentina 32.40 65.44 29.92 92.64 
Australia 41.04 38.83 53.87 54.18 
Austria 54.14 67.91 48.09 39.36 
Belgium 64.09 64.45 45.45 53.00 
Brazil 68.48 68.05 55.06 64.94 
Canada 39.25 34.02 37.64 47.46 
Chile 31.49 75.57 26.66 24.19 
China 51.34 44.01 25.96 32.45 
Colombia 46.97 70.07 37.78 60.28 
Czech Republic 69.88 77.75 57.75 28.70 
Denmark 57.55 51.28 47.34 55.14 
Finland 67.41 80.49 48.99 60.50 
France 75.68 80.27 75.15 70.69 
Germany 76.78 83.03 72.10 64.23 
Greece 68.97 71.89 47.03 49.24 
Hong Kong 59.87 52.90 29.53 32.32 
Hungary 89.23 78.68 90.59 91.11 
India 44.17 63.48 40.72 56.01 
Indonesia 77.85 82.32 20.98 48.08 
Ireland-Rep 48.92 54.77 36.26 60.90 
Israel 40.17 53.52 27.13 22.58 
Italy 65.19 67.30 55.06 54.92 
Japan 35.38 49.26 56.11 43.16 
Malaysia 43.12 60.08 32.29 40.76 
Mexico 48.90 39.07 43.33 41.41 
Morocco 61.42 91.92 15.37 13.76 
Netherlands 67.16 74.46 59.01 66.74 
New Zealand 69.24 45.92 46.72 51.77 
Nigeria 10.76 24.15 22.39 36.98 
Norway 71.62 68.91 78.47 68.48 
Peru 34.57 38.57 16.40 65.72 
Philippines 39.43 40.25 19.90 26.20 
Poland 37.32 40.67 15.15 25.93 
Portugal 71.44 68.41 38.12 54.58 
Russian Fed 65.62 66.16 26.20 52.46 
Singapore 34.12 61.59 30.50 43.31 
South Africa 60.13 69.84 63.02 80.66 
South Korea 50.96 57.32 44.88 45.92 
Spain 78.55 83.34 73.74 69.33 
Sweden 70.54 61.76 57.43 45.61 
Switzerland 68.12 74.26 61.16 68.41 
Taiwan 63.94 58.27 40.55 40.83 
Thailand 57.37 63.45 46.76 65.24 
Turkey 61.26 83.49 54.28 35.21 
Ukraine 6.80 21.58 10.50 26.18 
United Kingdom 64.47 64.34 58.79 62.57 
United States 48.68 39.29 49.64 41.38 





Appendix D2: Employee-Engagement by Acquirer Industry 
 
Acquirer Country Employment Quality Training & Development Workforce Diversity Health & Safety 
Agriculture 39.11 63.68 33.83 62.72 
Food Products 48.97 52.89 47.29 51.36 
Candy & Soda 60.12 65.50 60.64 68.34 
Beer & Liquor 53.09 57.60 52.77 50.77 
Tobacco Products 56.56 72.32 67.90 75.18 
Recreation 67.06 75.77 82.93 84.33 
Entertainment 37.71 30.51 34.23 35.60 
Printing and Publishing 51.93 53.60 57.89 41.32 
Consumer Goods 67.16 63.90 65.03 67.29 
Apparel 38.03 32.93 35.95 35.08 
Healthcare 48.77 47.27 51.31 35.58 
Medical Equipment 54.73 57.28 55.68 48.56 
Pharmaceutical Products 54.55 50.76 58.70 58.86 
Chemicals 56.58 60.98 62.46 74.67 
Rubber and Plastic Products 46.17 52.71 52.82 47.38 
Textiles 29.16 46.58 58.71 55.80 
Construction Material 55.44 56.83 47.19 68.62 
Construction 54.29 62.87 50.09 57.95 
Steel Works Etc 56.20 60.69 47.43 64.61 
Fabricated Products 26.36 41.31 26.45 27.67 
Machinery 46.22 53.02 44.94 51.43 
Electrical Equipment 59.70 62.68 63.86 61.10 
Automobiles and Truck 55.20 71.49 61.77 69.38 
Aircraft 57.26 64.19 56.70 72.50 
Shipbuilding, Railroad Equipment 67.50 69.95 42.64 43.21 
Defense 57.35 52.76 57.65 61.29 
Precious Metals 37.69 38.26 34.76 52.93 
Non-Metallic and Industrial Metal Mining 53.33 52.22 46.36 69.27 
Coal 55.99 66.54 57.90 75.97 
Petroleum and Natural Gas 52.52 49.26 48.67 64.20 
Utilities 64.73 68.13 67.54 71.80 
Communication 58.40 56.55 58.28 49.74 
Personal Services 41.04 33.22 42.94 32.91 
Business Services 51.76 48.71 49.20 43.61 
Computers 46.65 50.94 49.90 43.67 
Electronic Equipment 49.55 49.72 49.89 47.72 
Measuring and Control Equipment 43.21 36.69 43.77 43.81 
Business Supplies 65.95 60.88 63.32 68.39 
Shipping Containers 50.28 65.73 57.95 60.30 
Transportation 50.88 49.45 44.31 46.04 
Wholesale 45.46 51.88 57.29 39.91 
Retail 44.58 51.38 50.45 36.88 
Restaurants, Hotels, Motels 67.89 59.72 59.75 43.18 
Banking 64.45 62.17 56.84 42.35 
Insurance 62.54 63.38 69.29 40.84 
Real Estate 45.27 47.99 51.50 38.91 
Trading 50.03 44.50 45.66 35.00 
Other 53.21 51.19 61.16 55.31 






Appendix E. Robustness and Alternative Explanations: Instrumental Variable Approach 
 
This table shows results for a two-stage instrumental variable regression (IV-2SLS) where the dependent variable in the first 
stage (Model (1)) is the acquirer’s employment quality score and the independent variables are the industry-year average of the 
salaries and benefits expenses in the focal firm’s industry peers (IV), along with a cross-border deal dummy, their interaction, 
and a set of firm-, deal-, and country-level control variables. The dependent variable in the second stage (Model (2)) is the 
acquirer’s three-day CAR and the main independent variable is the acquirer’s instrumented pre-merger employment quality score, 
a cross-border deal dummy, and their interaction, along with the same set of deal- (relative deal size, dummies for serial acquirers, 
toeholds, multiple bidders, all-cash financed deals, hostile deals, diversifying deals, and public targets, and relative deal size), firm- 
(acquirer ROA and leverage), and country-level (labor protection indices as in Botero et al. (2004)) control variables. Each 
specification includes year, acquirer industry, and target industry fixed effects. The underidentification test refers to the Anderson 
canonical correlation statistics. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. *, ** and *** stand for statistical significance 
at the 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
 (1) (2) 
Dependent Variable: Acquirer CAR [-1,+1] 1st stage: DV = Employment Quality 2nd stage: DV = CAR [-1, 1] 
Acquirer Employment Quality t-1 
 0.095** 
 (0.046) 
Acquirer Employment Quality t-1 × Cross-Border 
 -0.081** 
 (0.041) 
Ind-Yr Average Salaries & Benefits Expenses t-1  
1.942***  
(0.516)  







Observations 4,511 4,511 
F-test 27.10 1.954 
Underidentification test (p-value) 0.004  
Deal-, Firm-, and Country-level Controls Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes 





Appendix F: Alternative Explanations for the Attenuating Effect in Cross-Border Deals 
 
This table shows regression results where the dependent variable is the acquirer’s three-day CAR around cross-border and domestic deal 
announcements. The main independent variable is the acquirer’s pre-merger employee quality score in terms of job security and monetary benefits, 
interacted with a cross-border deal dummy (Models 1 – 4). Model 5 interacts employment quality with an indicator for target firms having won an 
employment award for a sample of cross-border deals. Each specification includes a set of deal- (dummies for serial acquirers, toeholds, multiple 
bidders, all-cash financed deals, hostile deals, relative deal size, and public targets), firm- (acquirer ROA, size, and leverage), and country-level 
(acquirer and target country labor protection indices as in Botero et al. (2004)) control variables.  Each specification includes year, acquirer industry, 
target industry, and acquirer by target region fixed effects fixed effects. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. *, ** and *** stand for 
statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 




OECD Targets Non-OECD 
Targets 
Cross-Border 
      
Acquirer Employment Quality t-1 0.004** 0.010*** 0.008*** -0.001 -0.009** 
 (0.002) (0.004) (0.002) (0.007) (0.004) 
Cross-Border 1.293*** 1.527*** 1.225*** 1.147  
 (0.389) (0.262) (0.354) (0.952)  
Cross-Border x Acquirer Employment Quality t-1 -0.010** -0.020*** -0.016*** -0.010  
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.011)  
Target Won Employee Award     -0.894 
     (1.713) 
Target Won Employee Award x Acquirer Employment 
Quality t-1 
    0.019 
    (0.021) 
      
Observations 3,243 3,407 3,492 1,073 2,015 
Adj. R-squared 0.036 0.063 0.049 0.159 0.096 
Deal-, Firm-, and Country-Level Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Acquirer and Target Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 




Appendix G. Target and Acquirer Employee-Engagement, Placebo Tests 
This table shows regression results where the dependent variable is the acquirer’s three-day CAR around an M&A announcement. The independent 
variables dummies for combinations of above- and below-median target and acquirer employee relations in terms of employment quality (model 1), 
health and safety (model 2), workforce diversity (model 3), and training and development (model 4), and all combined (model 5). All specifications 
include a set of deal- (dummies for serial acquirers, toeholds, multiple bidders, all-cash financed deals, hostile deals, diversifying deals, and relative deal 
size), firm- (acquirer ROA, size, and leverage, and target ROA), and acquirer and target country-level (labor protection indices as in Botero et al. (2004)) 
control variables. Each specification includes year, acquirer industry, and target industry fixed effects.  
Dependent Variable: Acquirer CAR [-1,+1] (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Cross-Border 0.879 -1.688 0.598 0.117 1.111  
(1.273) (1.231) (1.205) (1.195) (1.580) 
Low Acq. Employment Quality, High Target Employment Quality -0.541    -0.623 
(1.041)    (1.080) 
Low Acq. Employment Quality, High Target Employment Quality × Cross-Border 0.270    0.840 
(1.590)    (1.596) 
High Acq. Employment Quality, Low Target Employment Quality 0.997    1.366 
(1.067)    (1.223) 
High Acq. Employment Quality, Low Target Employment Quality × Cross-Border -2.924*    -3.789** 
(1.567)    (1.653) 
High Acq. Employment Quality, High Target Employment Quality 2.288**    2.357* 
(1.145)    (1.307) 
High Acq. Employment Quality, High Target Employment Quality × Cross-Border -3.376**    -3.266* 
(1.626)    (1.808) 
Low Acq. Health and Safety, High Target Health and Safety  -0.384   -0.455 
 (1.098)   (1.296) 
Low Acq. Health and Safety, High Target Health and Safety × Cross-Border  1.536   2.802 
 (1.600)   (1.883) 
High Acq. Health and Safety, Low Target Health and Safety  -0.992   -1.215 
 (0.954)   (1.109) 
High Acq. Health and Safety, Low Target Health and Safety × Cross-Border  1.643   3.837* 
 (1.595)   (1.981) 
High Acq. Health and Safety, High Target Health and Safety  0.00713   -0.668 
 (1.216)   (1.449) 
High Acq. Health and Safety, High Target Health and Safety × Cross-Border  0.703   2.890 
 (1.628)   (2.029) 
Low Acq. WF Diversity, High Target WF Diversity   -0.547  -0.410 
  (1.157)  (1.337) 
Low Acq. WF Diversity, High Target WF Diversity × Cross-Border   -0.981  -1.406 
  (1.725)  (1.849) 
High Acq. WF Diversity, Low Target WF Diversity   -0.254  -0.232 
  (1.260)  (1.433) 
High Acq. WF Diversity, Low Target WF Diversity × Cross-Border   -0.990  -1.260 
  (1.754)  (1.941) 
High Acq. WF Diversity, High Target WF Diversity   0.386  0.267 
  (0.943)  (1.170) 
High Acq. WF Diversity, High Target WF Diversity × Cross-Border   -3.226**  -3.767** 
  (1.428)  (1.538) 
Low Acq. Training and Dev., High Target Training and Dev.    0.260 0.401 
   (1.193) (1.355) 
Low Acq. Training and Dev., High Target Training and Dev .× Cross-Border    -1.416 -2.756 
   (1.861) (2.122) 
High Acq. Training and Dev., Low Target Training and Dev.    -0.449 -0.698 
   (1.087) (1.403) 
High Acq. Training and Dev., Low Target Training and Dev .× Cross-Border    -0.998 -1.109 
   (1.716) (2.114) 
High Acq. Training and Dev., High Target Training and Dev.    0.223 -0.365 
   (1.069) (1.330) 
High Acq. Training and Dev., High Target Training and Dev .× Cross-Border    -1.360 -0.447 
   (1.392) (1.741) 
Observations 362 362 362 362 362 
Adj. R-squared 0.164 0.139 0.154 0.139 0.206 
Deal, Firm, and Country Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Acquirer Industry, Target Industry, and Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
